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ABSTRACT
Current strategic group research generally provides collectively meaningful assessments 
o f strategic group averages or median-based profiles. While this approach facilitates inter- 
group contrasts and performance predictions, potentially valuable information contained 
in intra-group differences (i.e., core-periphery-fringe zones) typically is overlooked. This 
multi-study research adopts a more fine-grained approach to strategic group analysis by 
investigating intra-group competitive profile and performance differences across such 
zones, both within and across groups. Study I o f this series identifies intra-strategic group 
zones that differ in strategic competitive profile and performance. Study II assesses how 
strategic groups and related intra-group zones might change over time, the stability o f 
groups as cohesive units over time, and the performance implications o f type, level and 
distance o f firm movement in and out o f these strategic group zones. Study m  
investigates the dynamics o f the reputation-strategic competitive position relationship. 
Ninety-five companies in the property/casualty sector o f the insurance industry were 
studied for the period 1993-1996. Some intra-group zones were found to possess 
homogenous segments relative to competitive position and performance, indicating the 
existence o f intra-strategic group structure. Two o f three identified strategic groups 
evidenced isomorphic type activity as competitive profiles o f these groups became more 
alike over the course o f the study, perhaps as the result o f fundamental environmental 
changes. Lastly, changes in reputation can be important in understanding causes o f 
strategic competitive profile change.
xi
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INTRODUCTION
Strategic group analysis has developed extensively since its introduction nearly 
thirty years ago in a study o f the major appliance industry. Substantial theoretical 
development and empirical testing o f differences across strategic groups are routine, and 
the strategic groups concept is commonly used to describe and understand acceptable, or 
legitimate, competitive approaches in a particular industry or market. This approach often 
includes analysis o f the relationship between strategy and performance. Resulting profiles 
have been historically viewed as more meaningful on a collective (or group), rather than 
individual firm, basis.
While the strategic groups concept has fostered many useful inter-group 
comparisons, there is little  indication researchers view firm homogeneity within strategic 
groups as a given. S till, the identification o f distinct intra configuration organizational, 
strategic profile, or performance differences has received only limited direct attention. 
Virtually no attempts can be found in extant literature to pinpoint actual firm location 
within a particular strategic group or how location changes over time, such as by mapping 
firm location.
Limited research has assessed inter-group strategic movement over time, including 
the appearance and subsequent disappearance o f certain transient groups. However, little 
has been done to examine patterns o f firm movement that might indicate imminent 
emergence, or disappearance, o f strategic groups. When changes to firm strategic 
competitive profiles do occur, they generally do not include all dimensions or all groups 
and such changes may be incremental. Although firms may be motivated to change their
1
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competitive strategic profile for many reasons, the pursuit o f a better reputation may be 
a compelling one. Preliminary theoretical research suggests a change in firm reputation 
may indicate a need to change the competitive position o f the firm.
To more fully explore intra strategic group competitive profiles and associated 
performance differences, along with any relationship between reputation change and 
strategic competitive positioning, the following three part study was undertaken. The first 
study pursued identification o f the existence ofmeaningfully different strategic competitive 
profiles within individual strategic groups, along with assessment o f performance 
differences across these intra-group segments. Strategic profiles were identified using 
resource deployments and scope o f operations variables, while economic and operational 
measures assessed performance differences.
The second study revolved around assessment o f intra strategic group profile and 
performance differences, with emphasis on how they change over time. O f particular 
interest was the industry sector evolution as it applies to ways o f coping with 
environmental issues through changes in strategic approaches, along with any resultant 
influence on performance. Mobility barriers are proposed to influence the strategic profile 
changes and movements both within and across groups. Once these concerns are 
understood longitudinally, prediction o f potentially emergent strategic profiles may be 
facilitated.
The third and final study in this series investigated the relationship between 
reputation change and strategic competitive positioning dynamics. Reputation is logically 
considered a valuable resource by many firms, especially those dependent on consumer
2
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confidence. For instance, firms in the insurance industry likely fit this category due to the 
future-oriented, contingent claim nature inherent to the intangible products they offer. The 
relationship between reputation change and shifts in strategic competitive position was o f 
primary interest here.
More precisely, the objectives o f the three studies were to: 1) identify strategic 
intra-group segments and study their competitive profile and performance relationship 
relative to the strategic group as a whole, 2) using these intra-group segments, determine 
if  strategic profile and performance differences emerge and change over time within and 
across strategic groups, and 3) examine the relationship between changes in firm 
reputation and competitive strategic group position. Theoretical implications and potential 
managerial applications are offered.
3
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STUDY I
INTRA-STRATEGIC GROUP PROFILES AND PERFORMANCE: 
DIFFERENCES ACROSS CORE, PERIPHERY AND FRINGE ZONES
Strategic group analysis has developed extensively since Hunt's (1972) inaugural 
application to the major appliance industry. The strategic groups concept is commonly 
used to provide insight into various competitors' strategic approaches, as well as the 
disposition ofthe strategy-performance relationship (Harrigan, 198S). Researchers have 
determined that strategic groups are not simply statistical artifacts (e.g., Nath and Gruca, 
1997) and can be useful for predicting performance (Ketchen et a/., 1997), one ofthe 
cornerstones o f strategy research (Summer et al., 1990). Substantial theoretical 
development and empirical testing o f differences across strategic groups (i.e., inter-group) 
is routine [see McGee and Thomas (1986), Thomas and Venkatraman (1988) and 
Ketchen, Thomas and Snow (1993) for reviews]. However, the identification o f distinct 
intra-configurational organizational, strategic or performance differences has received only 
limited direct attention (e.g., Cool and Schendel, 1988; Lawless, Bergh and Wilsted, 
1989).
Strategic groups act as reference points for firm  strategies (Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1995), and are used to rationalize firm choice o f similar resource bundles that 
circuitously result in mobility barriers. These reference points are pursued, particularly in 
uncertain environments, in an attempt to acquire and/or maintain legitimacy and thereby 
secure access to resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Groups with a strong identity 
may be able to influence individual firm action, whereas groups with a weak identity are 
potentially less dominant, particular i f  they are transitory in nature (Peteraf and Shanley,
4
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1997). Identity can be defined here as the level o f association, or alignment, with the 
strategic competitive characteristics o f the group - in other words, the degree o f coupling. 
Through this process o f institutionalization, particularly mimetic isomorphism in which 
firms copy or imitate what they perceive to be successful strategies (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), various intra-group combinations that we label core, periphery, and fringe zones 
result across strategic groups. This logic is also found in the problemistic search approach 
wherein problems stimulate a solution directed search that often results in decisions that 
mimic those o f other organizations in similar circumstances, especially when the cause and 
effect surrounding a particular problem is unclear (Cyert and March, 1963). Consolidation 
through isomorphic processes into a single group is never quite complete because o f 
barriers to group entry (Caves and Porter, 1977). These barriers take many forms, 
including market strategies, firm organization, methods o f supply and firm asset 
configuration, among others (McGee and Thomas, 1986).
Ample theoretical discussion o f intra-group differences suggests that strategic 
groups are not monolithic (e.g., Reger and Huf£ 1993; Ketchen etal., 1993). Some firms 
(i.e., the core) may have nearly all strategic characteristics in common, while others (i.e., 
the periphery) may have some commonality in their strategic profiles, but maintain unique 
features as well (Ketchen et al., 1993). Strategic groups may also claim some firms with 
even fewer similarities to the core and hence, even more uniqueness in strategic approach 
(i.e., the fringe). Although fringe and periphery firms may differ from their core on some 
dimensions, they may share similar strategic profiles among themselves - in other words, 
comprising zones within the broader strategic group. The existence o f such intra-group
5
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
zones may be due to common mobility barriers operating on periphery and fringe zone 
firms. Traditionally, mobility barriers have been considered an inter-group phenomenon 
that impeded inter-group movement (Caves and Porter, 1977). However, a more recent 
view is that mobility barriers operate on both the group and firm  levels (Mehra and Floyd,
1998).
Knowledge o f intra strategic group patterns and differences may help researchers 
and practitioners better understand key concepts in strategic group development and 
evolution. For instance, mobility barriers are fundamental to strategic group formation and 
existence (Caves and Porter, 1977; Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989). On the firm level, 
mobility barriers are the product o f past firm choices, which ultimately shape available 
strategies and create strategic rigidities by limiting future strategic choice, and hence entry 
to or exit from specific strategic groups (McGee and Thomas, 1986). On the group level, 
mobility barriers encourage cooperative effort by strategic group members to sustain and 
build these barriers to the groups’ benefit at the expense o f intra-group rivalry. For 
example, in the mid 1990s, many property/casualty insurance providers supported intense 
lobbying efforts designed to prevent banks and other financial institutions from selling 
property/casualty products to their banking customers, indicative o f mobility barrier 
building in the financial services industry.
Identification o f distinct intra-group zones is likely to contribute to our 
understanding o f strategic groups as a whole, and perhaps provide a framework from 
which to launch future exploration into whether mobility barriers operate on some
6
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collective intra-group level. This might include, but is not limited to, the identification o f 
which competitive variables are most important in the formation o f intra-group zones.
Using the theoretical underpinnings o f mobility barriers, and institutional, 
population ecology and strategic change theories, this paper endeavors to extend extant 
strategic groups literature by facilitating a clearer understanding o f the nature and intensity 
o f variances in these intra-group zones. We examined 95 companies in the 
property/casualty sector ofthe insurance industry for the year 1996 to assess key strategic 
profile dimensions and performance differences. More precisely, the objective o f this study 
is to determine the intensity and implication o f strategic profile and performance 
differences within strategic groups by analyzing intra-strategic group core, periphery and 
fringe zones in the property/casualty sector ofthe insurance industry.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Strategic groups are part o f the broader organizational configurations 
epistemology. Organizational configurations (hereafter referred to simply as 
configurations) can be defined as clusters o f strategic, structural, and procedural attributes 
commonly occurring across organizations (Miller, 1987; M iller and Mintzberg, 1983; 
Mintzberg, 1990). Studied under the guise o f many designations (e.g., strategic groups, 
typologies, taxonomies, and archetypes), configurations are presumed to capture the 
complexity o f organizational reality by identifying key firm characteristics o f a strategic 
profile. Analysis o f configurations can provide rich descriptions o f organizations that 
reveal their complex, gestalt, and systematic nature (M iller and Freisen, 1978). For 
example, Miles and Snow (1978) identified four distinct profiles (defenders, analyzers,
7
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prospectors, and reactors), each with a unique combination o f structure, decision making, 
market approach and performance potential.
Researchers studying configurations have traditionally held that it is more 
advantageous to identify and understand distinct, internally consistent sets o f firms (i.e., 
strategic groups) than to search for relationships that might hold across all organizations. 
Analysis o f strategic groups fosters identification o f important intra-industry strategic 
competitive profiles, such as the shared competitive behavior o f member firms within 
various groups (Aaker, 1983). These resultant strategic profiles o f eminent characteristics, 
the distinctiveness o f which are not individually but collectively meaningful, facilitates 
identification o f inter-group differences and predictions (M iller, 1987).
For instance, strategic group research has contributed to our knowledge o f inter­
group competitive behavior in many ways, including insight into the effects o f competitive 
rivalry (Cool and Dierickx, 1993); definition o f firm competitors (Porter, 1980); and 
reference points for those firms designing competitive strategy (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 
199S). Many studies also address the strategic group competitive profile-performance 
relationship (e.&, Lawless and Tegarden, 1991;Mehra, 1996). In general, strategic group 
analysis provides a useful aggregate view o f competitive behavior that lies between firm 
and industry levels.
I f  strategic groups were monolithic, then member firms would all possess the same 
resources, as well as competitive approach to the market. Although there is no indication 
researchers view firm homogeneity within groups as a likely scenario, the identification o f 
distinct intra-group strategic competitive profile or performance differences has received
8
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only limited direct attention (e.g., Cool and Schendd, 1988; Lawless, Bergh and Wilsted, 
1989). Identification o f distinct intra-group organizational, strategic or performance 
differences is potentially a more fine-grained approach to understanding strategic group 
profile and performance differences than is currently found in extant literature.
Although generally overlooked empirically, the conceptual notion ofintra-strategic 
group differences has received more generous attention. For instance, the intra-group 
variations concept has been characterized as core-secondary (Reger and Huff, 1993), core­
periphery (Ketchen, Thomas and Snow, 1993) and core-fringe (Caves and Porter, 1977). 
In a pivotal study, Reger and H uff (1993) serendipitiously observed that two o f three 
strategic group clusters displayed both a core and a secondary group. Others have 
proposed that configurations may not be monolithic, and are perhaps better conceptualized 
as containing more than one zone, (e.g., core and periphery) (Ketchen et al., 1993).
In essence, configurational core firms may specify the configuration's position, 
while "peripheral" firms share some key dimensions with core firms, but also possess 
unique qualities. For instance, executives often disagree about typing firms based on 
salient strategic profile characteristics (Miles and Snow, 1978), indicating some firms do 
not fit the strategic group “mold”  and that we should expect the existence o f non-core 
firms. As explained later, in this study we examine intra-group differences by exploring 
a single level o f core firms, and two levels o f non-core firms, which we label the periphery 
and fringe.
The institutional and mobility barriers literatures acknowledge that intra-group 
differences are likely key motivators and effects in the development and evolution o f
9
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groups o f competitors (e.g., DiMaggio and Powdl 1983; Caves and Porter, 1977). I f  
these differences impede strategic group consensus, their empirical identification would 
help explain limitations to isomorphism. Isomorphic theories suggest all firms in a 
particular competitive environment, like a strategic group, should all eventually resemble 
each other (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Intra-group differences may elude to barriers 
that either keep firms from moving away from or to this strategic consensus.
Strategic change literature may also be enhanced by identification o f strategic 
group zones. Currentapproachesto strategic group movement only provide evidence that 
a firm has changed strategic groups over time, with no attempts to pinpoint firm location 
within a particular strategic group, or how that location changes over time. Identifying 
intra-group differences provides more precise information on such strategic group change. 
Additionally, by studying patterns o f change, intra-group differences may help identify 
which firms have more movement options, particularly since exit and entry barriers are 
likely to differ across and within groups (Hatten and Hatten, 1987). I f  a firm is 
unprofitable when following a particular competitive profile and does not change to a 
different competitive profile, then it is likely that the firm does not have the option to 
change, probably due to mobility barriers. Conversely, if  a firm is profitable when 
following a particular competitive profile, it is unlikely that the firm would choose to 
change, even if  mobility barriers are not present.
On the strategic group level, investments in mobility barriers are viewed as risky, 
perhaps just exchanging short term for long term profitability (Porter, 1980), with high 
mobility barriers potentially producing traps when the industry changes (Harrigan, 1985).
10
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In order for change to take place at the industry level, mobility barriers must be 
asymmetrical, with some firms able to navigate them and others stuck (Hatten and Hatten,
1987). I f  this same logic were applied to the intra-group level, identification o f potentially 
problematic mobility barriers may help firms chose resource commitments more 
satisfactorily, or be more flexible during times o f change. Thus, the intra-group level o f 
analysis has the potential to provide a more intimate look at many important managerial 
theories, including, but not limited to, isomorphism, mobility barriers and strategic change.
In sum, although there is a lack o f empirical work on intra-group differences, the 
literature on mobility barriers, institutional theory, and to a lesser extent, organizational 
ecology, strategic choice, resource dependency and reference point theories, indicate 
support for intra-group differences. This theoretical support for the vitality and level o f 
differences expected in intra-group strategic profiles w ill be presented, followed by a 
discussion o f performance implications.
M obility Barriers
The mobility barriers literature has been directly tied to the development and 
distinctness o f strategic groups. Mobility barriers (i.e., entry and exit barriers between 
strategic groups) drive strategic group definition (e.g., Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989). 
Delineated strategic group characteristics arise from mobility factors, which impede 
replication or imitation o f key strategies and provide protection (McGee and Thomas, 
1986). Caves (1984) proposed that factors defining strategic groups are directly related 
to structural barriers to entry, explaining why some strategies result in higher profits than 
others in the same market. This perspective has generally been applied across strategic
11
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groups, however Mehra and Floyd (1998) propose that mobility barriers operate on two 
levels, including one with strategic group specific resources and one with firm specific 
resources. At the firm level, strategic change is limited by inertial forces attributed to the 
longitudinal collection o f competencies (Huff, Huff and Thomas, 1992), as well as cultural 
and structural characteristics unique to the firm (Barney, 1991). At the group level, 
isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984) serve to distinguish one strategic group from 
another. I f  there is some pattern in these firm level mobility barriers, such as might be 
associated with strategic group zones, then collectively this suggests that intra-group 
differences are mobility-barrier related and important phenomenon to study. In other 
words, if  the periphery and fringe zones share the same differences with the core, then this 
might suggest common mobility barriers) are preventing or discouraging these zones from 
core membership.
Inter-group mobility barriers can be raised by creating distances between strategic 
groups through investment in particular areas such as advertising or R&D (Porter, 1979). 
Groups can be differentiated by factors influencing such subtleties as the condition o f the 
sale but not the good itself (i.e., width o f product line), and factors obscure to the 
consumer (e.g., vertical integration) (Caves and Porter, 1977). The inter-group distance 
created by resource deployments and scope o f operations effectively acts as a mobility 
barrier, potentially lim iting movement across groups. Extant literature is not developed 
enough to determine what elements may act as intra-group mobility barriers.
In order to protect their competitive advantage, organizations actively seek to 
develop mobility or entry barriers to keep other firms out. Characteristics o f the barrier-
12
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building firm (e.g., market strategies, methods o f supply/firm asset configuration, 
boundaries/organization o f the firm) are a principal method o f such barrier creation 
(McGee and Thomas, 1986). Overcoming mobility barriers, and hence changing strategy, 
for a particular firm may involve a series o f moves before an acceptable long-term position 
is attained (Porter, 1979). Thus, the attempted development or removal o f mobility 
barriers should be considered along range undertaking requiring significant managerial and 
resource commitments. Firms frequently go through periods o f search and discovery when 
establishing or changing strategic direction (Mintzberg, 1978), exacerbating the strategic 
change process even more. Therefore particular firms, or even sets o f firms, may be in 
transition at any one point, indicating a divergence from core strategic profiles.
Mobility barriers are potentially asymmetrical within a group in that barriers to the 
more successful firms may be higher than those to less successful firms (Hatten and 
Hatten, 1987; Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989). For instance, inter-group mobility barriers 
can be raised through investments in specific functions, like marketing or R&D (Porter 
1979). Higher performance is usually enjoyed by firms able to create and maintain such 
barriers. With this in mind, it is proposed that such behavior could also create intra-group 
mobility barriers since not all group members are alike on all dimensions. The height o f 
mobility barriers is affected by the degree o f influence a particular resource has within a 
group (McGee and Thomas, 1986). Hence, significant differences in capabilities among 
intra-group members may result in intra-group variances in key strategy availability 
(Lawless, Bergh and Wilsted, 1989) and performance differences among strategic group 
members (Cool and Schendel, 1988).
13
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L i general, the mobility barrier literature supports the contention that intra-group 
differences are likely to exist. Yet the strategic groups literature, an obvious home for 
such exploration, is respite o f empirical studies specifically assessing the existence or 
influence o f intra-group differences, especially as they apply to mobility barriers. A direct 
test for such research would first require establishment o f meaningful intra-group 
differences. Only then could a longitudinal study be used to assess potential mobility 
barriers and their likely influence on firm mobility within and across strategic groups. The 
first step in this process w ill be undertaken in the current study. Precisely, identification 
o f distinct competitive profiles with particular strategic groups w ill be pursued, along with 
assessment o f performance differences across these intra-group zones. In support o f such 
exploration, specific institutional theory literature, as well as other related literature in the 
management field, w ill be invoked and discussed below.
Institutional Theory and Other Theoretical Support for Intra-group Zones
Institutional theory also provides support for the existence o f zones, or differences, 
within strategic groups. One o f the key interests o f institutional theory is examination o f 
the causes o f isomorphism - that is, the adoption across institutions o f similar strategies 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The extent o f isomorphism varies across organizations, 
with organizational behavior being a function o f internal and external forces (Oliver,
1988). For example, organizations are especially likely to mimic the behavior o f 
organizations to which they have network ties via boundary spanning personnel 
(Galakiewicz and Wasserman, 1989). Therefore we should expect variances that are to
14
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i certain degree firm, rather than strategic group, specific. These firm differences could 
collectively be viewed as differences within strategic groups.
Mimetic isomorphism assumes environmental uncertainty is related to 1) an 
increased tempo o f imitation o f legitimate or successful firms (Haveman, 1993; Westphal, 
Gulad and Shortell, 1997), 2) organizational convergence (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and 
3) increased strategic homogeneity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As firms mimic the 
successful strategies o f others (Haveman, 1993), ultimate isomorphic effects include 
increased organizational legitimacy (i.e., the acceptance of an organization by its external 
environment) (Deephouse, 1996), along with increased access to resources and higher 
performance. While early participants in this process may realize efficiency gains, later 
adopters realize legitimacy gains associated with adopting what may have become viewed 
as the norm (Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997). Another proposed isomorphic effect 
is the formation o f distinct, internally consistent groups o f firms, such as those found in a 
strategic group core. This logic presupposes that firms do change their strategic 
approaches, albeit at varying paces depending on the level o f environmental influence 
experienced at the individual firm level, supporting the contention that transitory intra­
group differences are likely to exist.
However, strategic responses to institutional processes may not be homogenous. 
Responses to environmental pressures may vary along a continuum that includes such 
strategies as acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation o f 
institutional processes (Oliver, 1991). Firm ability and desire to resist or respond to 
environmental pressures should ultimately influence the level o f coupling found across key
IS
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strategic dimension characteristics. In other words, we should expect variety in 
membership adherence to norms o f a particular strategic group, thus indicating the 
potential for the existence o f strategic group zones - that is, groups o f firms that adhere 
to these norms in similar ways.
I f  isomorphism in its truest form influenced change, then a single group would 
emerge over time. However, mobility barriers impede industry consolidation into a single 
group o f like firms in two ways (Caves and Porter, 1977). First, structural barriers to 
entry are created by the very factors that demarcate the strategic groups, and they account 
for the performance differences between groups. Secondly, this intra-group behavior 
across firms is likely to be very similar due to firm interdependencies, indicating potential 
cooperation in continued support o f mobility barrier building for the group’s benefit at the 
expense o f intra-group rivalry. In essence, while isomorphic pressures are “pushing” firms 
toward a common strategic profile, mobility barriers - some o f them enacted and 
supported by the like firms - are encouraging limitations to group consensus.
A blending o f institutional and resource dependency theory may also help explain 
potential intra-group differences. While institutional theory considers the firm’s 
environment deterministic over time, resource dependence theory tends to emphasize the 
task environment and a choice o f behaviors that firms can exercise. Both perspectives 
emphasize the importance o f obtaining legitimacy for purposes o f demonstrating social 
worthiness and mobilizing resources, although resource dependence theory places 
emphasis on controlling rather than conforming to institutional criteria (Oliver, 1991).
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Either way, strategic decisions over time determine the firm's asset base (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989).
Ultimately, strategic group members who have made even somewhat different 
strategic decisions may have substantial variance in their asset bases, and hence available 
strategic choices (Oliver, 1991). Past strategic decisions influence attainable strategic 
choices, and differences are likely to occur. In similar parallel arguments, population 
ecology and strategic choice theories both address industry change over time. First, 
population ecologists view the environment as deterministic in that environments select 
organizations for survival based on fit between the organizational form and the 
environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). In the long run, managerial decisions do not 
matter since firms that fit the environment less fall out. A second perspective is that o f 
strategic choice, which views the organization as an open system that confronts and 
responds to opportunities and/or threats in the environment (Child, 1972). In general, 
organizational ecologists claim environmental pressures ultimately determine successful 
organizational strategy, function and form (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977), 
while strategic choice theorists propose organizations enact and manipulate their 
environment (e.g., Child, 1972).
Although at odds with each other on the surface, some researchers view these 
perspectives not as mutually exclusive, but complementary in that environmental 
determinism and strategic choice both influence adaptation within an industry over time 
(e.g., Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985; Zammuto, 1988). Although part o f the same industry, 
individual firms are influenced by the environment to varying degrees, and make choices
17
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in different ways depending on their desire and capacity to respond (Oliver, 1988). For 
example, as previously mentioned, strategic responses to the environment may not be 
homogenous, and are proposed to fall on a continuum that indudes acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation o f institutional processes (Oliver, 
1991). Differences in firm response may be reflective o f corporate culture or the goals o f 
strategic leaders. Firm capacity to respond may be influenced by limitations assodated 
with past strategic dedsions that create isolating mechanisms, such as sunk, switching or 
research costs (McGee and Thomas, 1986).
The deterministic perspective advocates that during periods o f environmental 
stability, generalist w ill outperform specialists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). During 
periods o f rapid change, generalist spend most o f their time adjusting their internal 
structure, not acting strategically, and therefore have lower performance (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977). The generalist resemble the core firms in the current study in that 
generalist populate competitive areas where many firms can and do operate by serving 
broad-based markets using the same or similar competitive strategic “ recipe” . Spedalist 
resemble the periphery, and to a greater extent the fringe zones, in that a few firms operate 
in each zone and use competitive recipes that are similar to each other, but somewhat 
different from the core firms along some competitive variables.
However, niche theory predicts just the opposite and advocates that generalist (/. e., 
core firms) have higher performance in unstable environments, while specialists {i.e., non­
core firms) have higher performance in stable environments (Levin, 1962,1968). From 
the resource dependency point o f view, organizations are dependent on their environment
18
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for particular resources and the environment is not always certain. In order to perform 
successfully, organizations use different methods to cope with their environment. This 
includes integration to deal with interdependencies and differentiation to cope with 
diversity. Respectively, these approximate the core and non-core zones in the current 
research. Additional discussion o f performance implications associated with strategic 
group segment location can be found in the following Research Agenda section.
In order to more folly comprehend the potential ramifications o f intra-strategic 
group variations, the current research w ill examine whether significant intra-group 
strategic profile and performance differences exist across core, periphery and fringe zones. 
I f  so, does strategic alignment with particular zones have performance ramifications? 
Identification o f such strategic characteristics and potential performance differences w ill 
permit a more precise understanding o f strategic group properties.
RESEARCH AGENDA 
Although theory suggests we should anticipate intra-group differences in strategic 
profiles and performance, these intra-group differences have not been adequately 
empirically explored. In the current paper, two primary stages o f empirical exploration 
w ill be pursued. First, an assessment o f intra-group strategic profile differences w ill be 
addressed. This w ill be followed by an evaluation o f any performance differences 
associated with membership in particular zones o f strategic groups.
Intra-group Strategic Profiles
Comparisons o f variations across groups assumes identifiable dimensions 
contribute to strategic group uniqueness. However, these dimensions, traditionally
19
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reported as group norms, represent averages o f the variables ofinterest, which may or may 
not be a proficient indicator o f true group idiosyncracies. This may be especially true if  
strategic groups are indeed not monolithic and do, in fact, contain multiple zones.
By nature, strategic group norms represent some firms with somewhat similar 
characteristics, as well as other firms who may have some similar and some very distinct 
characteristics. Peripheral firms are believed to possess some characteristics divergent 
from those o f core firms in their configuration (Reger and Huff, 1993; Ketchen et a/., 
1993). In the current study, another level o f non-core grouping is explored. Fringe 
segment firms are believe to possess, again, some o f the same characteristics as the core 
firm, but also possess more divergence from these characteristics than the peripheral firms.
These differences likely take one oftwo forms, and the current study should reveal 
which is more likely to occur. First, intra-group differences could be strategic group zone 
specific and, in a sense, represent niches within the strategic group where there is room for 
more than one firm. Firms in the non-core zones could have some common strategic 
elements with the core, but have differences on other strategically important elements. 
These firms could occupy niches where there is only room for a few firms, or perhaps 
represent firms either unwilling or unable to change competitive profiles. Competitive 
advantage supposition suggests these niches, to the degree they are able to possess 
resources that are rare, inimitable, valuable, and with few substitutes, perhaps have 
competitive advantage over other firms (Barney, 1991).
In order to consider these intra-group differences, variables representing 
organizational strategic profiles needed to be identified. The important dimensions to
20
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strategic group membership are congruence in competitive behaviors intended to maintain 
or alter a firm’s competitive advantage (Caves, 1984; Cool, 1985; Cool and Schendel, 
1988; McGee and Thomas, 1986). Variables measuring scope o f operations and resource 
deployment appear to capture these organizational strategies fundamental to competition 
(Cool and Schendel, 1987,1988; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990;Mehra, 1996). Several 
seminal works on competitive strategy (eg., Katz, 1970; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; 
Rumeit, 1979; Day, 1984) collectively support the notion that business scope and resource 
commitments (i.e., deployments) captures the essences o f competitive strategic profiles 
(Cool and Schendel, 1987). Hence, they w ill be used in this paper. Determination o f 
specific strategic competitive profile differences within strategic groups w ill be pursued 
by 1) identifying specific scope o f operations and resource deployment variables 
appropriate for the property/casualty sector o f the insurance industry, and 2) measuring 
differences across the variables within strategic groups.
Intra-strategic group zone profiles should vary on some important scope o f 
operations and resource deployment variables, but not on all. In other words, there w ill 
be some variables in which intra-group zones are not significantly different, and other 
variables on which significant differences w ill be noted. Extant literature is not developed 
well enough to predict which variables might differ, thus inductive inferences derived from 
the current study should help develop understanding o f competitive differences. There 
may be some continuity in that variables differing across the zones o f one group may vary 
across the zones o f the other groups. However, based upon the fundamental concept that 
strategic groups differ on important aspects o f competition (e.g., Hunt, 1972) and the
21
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belief that strategic groups are not monolithic, some diversity should be strategic group 
or zone specific.
Another possibility is that firms in the fringe and periphery o f a specific strategic 
group differ from the core on the same dimensions, just to varying degrees. This scenario 
would perhaps provide the strongest case for true patterns o f isomorphic divergence. In 
other words, this might indicate the presence o f mobility barriers that lim it access to or 
movement from the core. Again, extant literature is not developed well enough to predict 
whether this occurrence is likely. In order to study intra-strategic group profile 
differences, as measured by scope o f operation and resource deployment variables, 
strategic groups w ill be stratified into core, periphery and fringe zones, then compared to 
determine the following:
Question 1: What differences in competitive strategic profiles exist within
strategic groups?
Performance Implications
Performance implications o f the degree o f commitment to a particular strategic 
group profile are addressed theoretically, but are seldom addressed empirically. While 
significant performance differences are routinely assessed across strategic groups, little  
research has addressed intra-group differences. Preliminary limited investigations o f 
deviations from strategic group norms indicate performance differences, but no direction 
is noted (Lawless, Bergh and Wilsted, 1989). In this early work, a 95% confidence 
interval about the group mean was used to dissect each strategic group, then performance 
was compared on these two intra-group zones. One criticism is that up to 68% o f firms 
fell outside the 95% confidence interval. Such a result potentially indicates a lack o f true
22
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initial strategic group structure. Additionally, the authors did not provide commonly 
recognized evidence that these strategic groups existed in a meaningful way, such as by 
showing Wilks lambda statistics and/or F statistics with significance levels on differences 
across variables o f interest, thereby again limiting the conclusiveness or usefulness o f their 
findings.
Cool and Schendel (1988) used a single measure, return on sales, to test equality 
o f return among intra-group firms, a hypothesis rejected in the study. However, the 
limited performance measures concerned even the authors, who acknowledged a 
preference for a return on assets measure, which was unavailable. The authors also had 
preference for financial market measures, although they believed them unsuitable for 
performance measures in diversified firms. Thus, although intra-group performance 
differences have been addressed empirically, methodological concerns lim it their 
conclusiveness. However, there is a rather substantial, although equivocal, body o f 
literature that theoretically suggests what researchers might expect to find in the study o f 
performance ramifications associated with deviance from core strategic profiles.
The organizing principles underlying managerial strategic decisions covets 
differentiation o f a firm from its competitors (Kotha, Dunbar and Bird; 199S), indicating 
a desire for uniqueness, perhaps through locating in a non-core segment. In fact, 
maintenance o f a sustainable competitive advantage depends upon the degree o f 
uniqueness, value, imitability and substitutability o f a firm's core competence (Barney, 
1991). Firm affiliation with strategic group periphery as opposed to the core may be 
reflective o f organizations seeking a sustainable competitive advantage. Such a peripheral
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position would be beneficial, not detrimental, to performance (Bharadwaj, Varadarajanand 
Fahy, 1993). For instance, the sustainable competitive advantage o f any firm is impacted 
by imperfectly competing markets in that not all resources are available to all competitors. 
For example, an alliance with firms who understand the “competitive landscape”  should 
increase the ability o f a firm to respond quickly to environmental changes (Bettis and Hitt, 
199S). On the industry level, strategic diversity among competitors appears to foster 
mutual gains across firms (Porter, 1991; Miles and Snow, 1986). Firm performance and 
industry variety have been shown to be positively related (Miles, Snow and Sharfinan,
1993).
Conversely, some propose that deviation from the strategic group core profile 
could result in lower performance. For instance, firms entering a group on the fringe may 
face quasi-monopolistic intra-group profits and potential resource mis-allocation if  
strategies chosen by the dominant core block expansion possibilities for the fringe (Caves 
and Porter, 1977). This closely follows research on the strategic deviation-performance 
relationship at the industry level. In general, firm nonconformity to industry competitive 
norms is associated with subsequent declines in organizational performance (M iller and 
Chen, 199S), and negatively impacts the performance o f both small and large competitors 
(Chen and Hambrick, 1993).
Other research suggests a U-shaped relationship between strategic uniqueness and 
performance. Within a particular industry, high levels o f both firm strategic heterogeneity 
and homogeneity have been shown to produce higher levels o f performance, while 
moderate strategic variety leads to losses (Dooley, Fowler and M iller, 1996). This
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indicates that firms should be wary o f being only slightly different. In sum, there is no 
consensus in extant inquiry about the performance implications o f deviations from the 
accepted strategic group profiles as might be found in non-core firms. Therefore, 
exploration o f intra-group performance differences is generally limited to:
Question 2: Do performance differences exist across strategic group zones?
METHODS
The Insurance Industry in 1996: Data Sources and Sample
The industry. A angle industry was chosen for this study primarily because 
strategic groups are generally considered an intra-industry concept, with the strategy- 
performance relationship potentially varying by industry (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985), and 
industry stage o f life cycle (Miles, Snow and Sharfman, 1993). The research questions in 
this study relate not only to the strategy-performance relationship, but also to differences 
within and between strategic groups, so an industry with strategic variety was necessary. 
The insurance industry was chosen because o f the high degree o f change experienced in 
the industry over the past few years (Gagne, 1996; Mayewski etal., 1996; Scully, 1996), 
indicating the potential for variety in strategic approaches and resultant performance. 
Additionally, preliminary industry research revealed different strategic approaches to the 
market were longitudinally evident (e.g., Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990).
The insurance industry is often segmented into two major components, namely, 
life/health and property/casualty. At the end o f1996, the insurance industry in the United 
States employed more than 2.2 million people and controlled more than $3.1 trillion in 
assets (Insurance Information Institute, 1998). Approximately3,350 companies sold some
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form o f property/casualty insurance as o f year end 1995 (Insurance Information Institute, 
1998) and more than 1,700 companies primarily sold life insurance (American Council, 
1997). Although most companies specialize in one segment or the other, many operate 
in multiple lines and/or cooperate in fleets, which are insurer groups that function under 
common management. For example, the State Farm Group is a fleet often companies 
primarily known for writing property/casualty insurance but two o f the subsidiaries focus 
on life/health insurance (NAIC Listing o f Companies, 1996).
The insurance industry is highly regulated, primarily at the state rather than federal 
level as a result o f the McCarran-Ferguson Act o f 1945 (Public Law 79:15, U.S.C.A. 
§1012). Regulatory activity over the business o f insurance can be divided into two broad 
categories, namely insurer solvency and market conduct. State insurance regulators 
cooperate and coordinate activity across jurisdictions through the National Association o f 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a voluntary quasi-govemmental body having no formal 
authority to compel individual state legislators or regulators to act. Primary areas where 
NAIC supports state regulators include the development and maintenance o f uniform 
insurer financial reporting systems, drafting model laws and/or regulations that state 
legislatures can adopt or modify to individual state needs, and developing alternative 
strategies for dealing with industry issues (Huebner, Black and Webb, 1996).
Data sources. The primary source o f data was the statutory annual financial 
statements o f individual insurance companies. These statements are required by the 
governmental regulatory body o f every state in which the company is domiciled or licensed 
to operate, and are submitted in a uniform format governed by the NAIC. These
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statements are collectively available from OneSource, a private firm licensed by NAIC to 
distribute these data. Supplemental information was obtained from several other sources, 
including 1) publications o f the A.M. Best Company, the premier insurer rating 
organization since 1900,2) Property/Casualty Insurance Facts, published annually by the 
Insurance Information Institute, and 3) Life Insurance Fact Book, published annually by 
the American Council o f Life Insurance.
Sample. Previous insurance industry strategic group research used limited samples, 
containing only the largest fleets in terms o f total premium volume (i.e., the "top 30" by 
sales in the industry) (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990; Fiegenbaum, 1987). This approach 
eliminated small organizations from study, yet still encompassed approximately 75% o f 
total industry premiums written. The current study employed the top 100 
property/casualty firms by 1996 premiums written for which complete data were available, 
representing 64% o f total market share.
The insurance industry is dominated by large firms that operate substantially 
different from their smaller counterparts to the extent that including both in the same study 
would have likely produced results not useful to either sector. This is primarily so because 
insurer size influences many facets o f operation, including scale and scope o f operations 
(Johnson, Flanigan and Weisbart, 1981; Doherty, 1981). In general, the largest insurers 
are multi-billion dollar operations with potentially hundreds o f distribution points and 
either mutual or widely held stock ownership. Conversely, the smallest firms often have 
less than one million dollars in sales, few distribution points and are closely held, non- 
publidy traded stock companies. Thus, even though small firms in the industry are
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excluded, firms in the same strategic space are not excluded. Small firms are not expected 
to follow the same isomorphic path, primarily because their mobility barriers are expected 
to be different from those o f large firms. Although there may be some overlap in the 
markets served by small and large firms, they are generally not competitors in the truest 
sense.
One important implication o f sample size is its effect on statistical power. An alpha 
= .10 was deemed acceptable for this exploratory work, resulting in adequate statistical 
power to detect all large and medium effects, although we could not be sure o f detecting 
all small effects (Cohen, 1988). Thus, a trade-off was precipitated by the decision to 
include firms most clearly in competition with each other (i.e., large firms) at the expense 
o f statistical power relative to small effects. In order to take a more fine-grained look at 
strategic profiles, firms (individual companies) were the level o f analysis in this study, as 
opposed to earlier work which used fleets (groups o f companies) (Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1990; Fiegenbaum, 1987).
Strategic Groups in the Insurance Industry
The insurance industry is a dynamic industry, regularly subjected to broad 
environmental, regulatory and competitive change. Such volatility can induce 
organizations to modify their behavior in many ways, as reflected by changes in 
organizational strategic profiles. For example, during the period 1970-84the industry was 
characterized by performance differences across strategic groups, and groups that changed 
over time, both in number and membership (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990). The 1985-
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96 period was similar in environmental and competitive change levels, although there is 
no known assessment o f strategic group behavior in the insurance industry for this period. 
Strategic Variables
The development o f strategic dimensions useful in assessing strategic group 
membership and behavior has traditionally followed one o f two paths. The first is a more 
market-based approach that proposes strategic groups result from similarity in traits 
critical to competition regardless o f the industry o f study. Specifically, scope o f operations 
and method o f developing competitive advantage variables have been identified as 
measures capturing these traits (Zammuto, 1988; Ketchen, Thomas and Snow, 1993). The 
second approach to strategic group definition is a more resource-based approach that 
recognizes scope o f operations and resource deployments as the two critical dimensions 
(Cool and Schendel, 1987,1988; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996).
The resource deployment component o f the second approach encompasses both 
market-based commitments (from the first approach) through variables such as distribution 
strategies, but also includes other resource commitments, such as financial leverage. While 
both recognize competitive scope, the later approach appears most appropriate for the 
current research because the second dimension, resource deployments, is more inclusive 
o f factors believed important to competition (Cool and Schendel, 1987). Specifically, 
adding the resource deployment elements such as leverage and investment practices 
provides a clearer indication o f overall resource utilization in pursuit o f competitive 
endeavors, not just those associated with market approaches to distribution, as would be 
measured by variables such as agency. This approach may be particularly salient for the
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current study given that insurers rely heavily on investment earnings to supplement 
operating profits (or offset losses) (Huebner, Black and Webb, 1996). Thus, the current 
study w ill draw upon scope o f operations and resource deployments as dimensions useful 
in strategic group definition.
In keeping with the notion that researchers should understand the industry o f study 
before selecting variables (Cool and Schendel, 1987), an expert panel was employed in 
order to capture as accurately as possible the nuances o f variables pertinent in describing 
insurance firm strategic profiles. This panel consisted o f five risk management and 
insurance academic researchers, all with different educational and employment 
backgrounds and all with significant industry consulting backgrounds, and two strategic 
management researchers.
A review o f the extant literature in both areas, a series o f conversations, proposals 
o f variables to include (in both directions), and revisions resulted in selection o f seven 
variables representing scope o f operations and four variables representing resource 
deployments used to join firms into groups, and finally zones. Five performance variables, 
three representing economic and two representing operational measures, were deemed 
appropriate (see Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). Table 1.1 presents scope o f 
operations and resource deployment measures used in this study, while Table 1.2 presents 
those used to assess performance. The following is a more complete description o f logic 
behind their usage.
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Personal Net Premiums Written fNPW) 
Personal NPW+ Commercial NPW
Property NPW 
Total NPW (A ll Lines Written)
(Fidelity + Surety + Guaranty, etc) NPW 
Total NPW (A ll Lines Written)
H = 1 ~ t p f
i - i
where: P, is relative size o f /th line in firm 
portfolio (/ = 1... n lines)
Ln (Total Admitted Assets)
Stock = 1; Non-Stock = 0 (i.e.. Mutuals. Mutual- 
owned stocks, Reciprocals, Lloyds)
19% - Year o f Incorporation
Agency = 1; Non-Agency = 0
Direct Premiums Written - NPW 
NPW
Net Earned Premium 
Policyholder Surplus
Minityayas + Comm’l Real Estate + Junk + etc. 
US Governments + Investment Grade Corporates
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Change in Premium CHG_P N P W ^v_ .N P W ^y ,
NPWptoy^
Change in Surplus CHGJS Adjusted Surolusr.-------- Adjusted Sun>Ius~_,-_
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Scope o f operations variables. Scope o f operations is the degree to which an 
organization sells products offered by the industry, or the number o f niches in which the 
firm operates. The insurance industry is commonly characterized as having two important, 
non-mutuatty exclusive, scope o f operations dimensions: 1) type o f customer (i.e., 
personal or commercial lines), and 2) type o f product (e.g., life/health or 
property/casualty). In addition, the diversity in business lines sold by the firm, as well as 
ownership structure and organizational age and size, are expected to be indicators o f 
relative scope o f operations.
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Personal versus commercial lines (PPERSk This scope o f operations variable 
represents the division o f customers into two groups, with personal lines representing 
policies primarily sold to individuals (e.g., homeowners, private passenger auto insurance, 
etc.,) and commercial lines representing insurance primarily sold to businesses (e.g., ocean 
marine, fidelity, workers compensation, commercial multi-peril). Both personal and 
commercial lines sectors exhibit unique demand and market characteristics that may 
induce insurers to compete in the development and supply o f products to satisfy the 
individual needs o f insurance consumers in each market. The PPERS variable measures 
the proportion o f personal lines business relative to total net premiums written.
Proportion o f property lines (PPROP1. Three major types o f financial loss 
exposures are generally covered by products sold by property/casualty insurers: property 
exposures (e.g., direct and associated indirect losses suffered by the primary policyholder), 
liability exposures (e.g., to indemnify others for acts that are the responsibility o f the 
primary insured), and other miscellaneous financial exposures that may adversely affect 
the primary policyholder due to the failure o f some third party to perform (e.g., fidelity, 
surety bonding, credit insurance). The proportion o f property insurance written reflects 
the extent o f organizational involvement, or product mix, in the first o f these three major 
product areas. Some property insurance policies, mainly in personal lines (e.g., 
homeowners, auto), are multi-line in that both property and liability coverages are sold as 
part o f the same package. Fortunately, statutory insurance accounting affords details o f 
the breakdown o f premiums by line, especially with respect to auto insurance, which 
accounts for over 45% oftotal industry premiums (Insurance Information Institute, 1998).
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The PPROP variable measures the proportion o f property lines business relative to total 
net premiums written.
Proportion o f financial products (PFNANV The proportion o f operations 
derived from products dealing with the third major product area (financial exposures 
resulting from the failure o f others) such as fidelity coverage, surety and performance 
bonds, mortgage guaranty and credit insurance, allows a better distinction among 
companies specializing in these important niche areas. To avoid multicollinearity, the 
second major product segment, the relative proportion o f liability insurance, is not 
included. The PFNAN variable measures the proportion ofbusiness derived from financial 
lines relative to total net premiums written.
Diversification fP IVER l. The insurance industry as a whole offers over 30 
different product lines, with a multitude o f different policies sold within each line. The 
number o f lines an organization chooses to offer, as well as the relative emphasis placed 
on each line offered, reflects strategic choices having many implications, such as reduced 
portfolio risk (Huebner, Black and Webb, 19%). A Herfindal index is designed to 
measure the extent o f firm  diversification across lines o f business (Pitts and Hopkins, 
1982), and w ill be used in this research. Higher values on this index indicate greater 
diversification across lines ofbusiness.
Size fLS H g), Size can influence organizational market power, flexibility and 
strategic response to environmental concerns. For instance, larger firms have greater 
market power that tends to increase the sustainability o f competitive actions and outcomes 
(H itt, Ireland and Hoskisson, 199S). However, larger firms may also have greater
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bureaucratic structure and rules which tends to decrease the flexibility o f competitive 
actions and outcomes (H itt, Ireland and Hosldsson, 1995). Insurer size is expected to 
influence scope o f operations because o f potential economies o f scale and scope (e.g., 
Doherty, 1981; Johnson, Flanigan and Weisbart, 1981). The natural log o f total admitted 
assets is employed in order to mitigate adverse effects o f skewness in insurer size that 
exist across the industry (Hair et al., 1995).
Ownership form (OWNER!. The insurance industry is dominated by two major 
forms o f ownership: mutual and stock. Mutual insurers combine the owner and 
policyholder roles, while stock insurers clearly demarcate owner/investor and policyholder 
functions. The stock form o f ownership characterizes the overwhelming majority o f 
insurers. Mutual insurers are far fewer in number and comprise less than 10% o f the 
industry in terms o f number o f firms, yet they control approximately 40% o f total industry 
assets and premium volume (Insurance Information Institute, 1998).
Differences in ownership structure have very important implications for managerial 
incentives and the relative discretion o f managers to act upon those incentives, including 
breadth and scope o f insurer operations [Jensen and Meckling (1976), Mayers and Smith 
(1981,1988,1994), et seq]. For example, managers o f non-stock firms (e.g., mutuals) 
have considerably more discretion and incentives to act in their own best interest, rather 
than the policyholders, because o f their relative insulation from the market for corporate 
control (Mayers and Smith, 1994). The ownership and customer functions are combined 
in non-stock firms, whereas they are separate in stock firms. Because o f differences 
inherent in policyholder and stockholder goals, non-stock firms are characterized by their
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cost-centered orientation, whereas stock firms are considered more profit oriented 
(Mayers and Smith, 1981). A binary variable is employed to proxy strategic differences 
that result from differences in owner, and hence managerial, incentives between stock and 
non-stock insurance ownership forms. Also, following Mayers and Smith (1981), those 
stock insurers whose ultimate parent is in fact a mutual or other non-stock form are coded 
as non-stock firms as they are expected to behave more like their parent than a traditional 
widely-held stock insurer.
AyefAGEl. Age is an important factor in determining scope o f operations in that 
insurance companies often acquire their customers, credibility and capacity to sell multiple 
product lines over time. Thus, older firms should possess more options relative to scope 
o f operations (Trieschmann and Gustavson, 1995). Reputational capital is a vitally 
important asset in the business o f insurance, a financial service industry in which 
fundamental success necessarily requires public trust and confidence. Age is strongly 
correlated with reputation and organizational survival (Anderson and Formisano, 1988). 
Age is calculated as 1996, which represents the year o f the data, minus the year o f 
incorporation.
Resource deployment variables. In general, organizations use their resources 
to enhance organizational value, particularly through efficient operations and financial 
management. The level o f resource commitment to various firm functions can be 
indicative o f organizational commitment to production efficiency. Strategic choices 
regarding capital resources and investment also influence opportunities to create value by 
attentiveness to financial management issues.
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Distribution system (AGENCY). The method o f product dissemination into 
thdr target market(s) represents a crucial competitive strategic decision for any firm. 
Much property-liability insurance in the United States is sold through the "American 
agency" (or, indirect) system, wherein insurance products are channeled to customers 
through either independent agents (i.e., independent contractors who may represent a 
number o f otherwise unrelated insurers) and/or brokers (i.e., contractors who have no 
advance commitment to any insurer and legally represent insureds as clients). Other 
insurers, known in the industry as direct writers, utilize either exclusive agents (i.e., 
contractors who represent one insurer or group o f commonly owned insurers only), 
salaried employees and/or mass merchandising techniques (e.g., mail, Internet) to market 
and distribute their products. An insurer's choice o f whether to use agency (indirect) or 
direct distribution channels has significant implications regarding relative managerial 
control over product marketing and degree o f potential market penetration, as well as 
overall cost effectiveness, among other competitive factors (Barrese and Nelson, 1992). 
A binary variable (agency = 1; non-agency -  0) is used to depict whether an agency or 
non-agency distribution system is utilized.
Reinsurance (REPO. Reinsurance is the transfer o f all or a portion o f a 
particular risk by a primary insurer to another insurer or insurers, which further spreads 
the risk and results in reduction o f exposure to extraordinary losses. In effect, an 
insurance firm buys insurance on its portfolio o f risks. Reinsurance can provide several 
benefits including increased financial capacity, stabilization o f profits, reduction o f 
unearned premium reserves, and surplus relief. One o f the most important benefits o f
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
reinsurance may be facilitation o f entry or exit from a particular line o f business, thus 
potentially diminishing a mobility barrier created by regulatory obligation to offer 
continuity o f coverage (Treischmann and Gustavson, 1995:607). The use o f reinsurance 
can therefore expedite capitalization o f new competitive opportunities (Mayers and Smith, 
1990). The REIN variable is captured by the difference between direct premiums written 
and net premiums written, divided by net premiums written.
Financial leverage (LEVER1. Insurance companies rarely issue traditional debt 
instruments due to the primary contingent liability nature o f the obligations they naturally 
assume issuing contracts o f insurance. However, this does not mean insurers are unable 
to strategically employ leverage to magnify potential returns as any other entity is able to 
do. One measure o f financial leverage for insurers is the ratio o f net premiums earned to 
policyholder surplus.
Net premiums earned represents the portion o f total policy premiums written 
where the contracted obligation for coverage already has been provided. 
Acknowledgment o f net premiums earned varies by industry sector, for example, life 
insurer premiums are considered 100% earned when received by an insurer whereas 
property/casualty insurer premiums are essentially amortized over the life o f the policy. 
Policyholders1 surplus, the preferred industry equivalent o f owners' equity, represents the 
accounting difference between firm available asset base and its total liability obligations. 
The use o f financial leverage by insurers can magnify potential returns obtained through 
their underwriting operations and commensurate investment activities (Anderson and
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Formisano, 1988). The LEVER variable is calculated as net earned premiums divided by 
policyholder surplus.
Investment strategy flNVESTl. Investment strategies represent organizational 
choices o f acceptable risk/return relationships, with investment earnings offsetting 
(supplementing) underwriting losses (profits). While firms in most other industries are 
virtually free to invest in stocks, bonds, derivatives, etc. as they wish, insurers operate in 
a highly regulated environment where investment choices are constrained by state statutes. 
For instance, property/casualty companies are prohibited from investing more than 10% 
o f their assets in stock o f any one non-closely related corporation, and real estate holdings 
cannot exceed more than 10% o f total assets (Huebner, Black and Webb, 1996:653). 
Such regulatory constraints induce the typical insurer to invest heavily in relatively lower 
risk government and higher quality commercial securities, with equity investments 
generally being predominantly preferred stock (Insurance Information Institute, 1998).
However, insurers can and do invest in other than low risk government and high- 
grade corporate securities. The proportion o f more risky investments (e.g., mortgages, 
junk bonds, commercial real estate) to relatively safe investments (e.g., government 
securities, high grade corporate stocks) for a given insurer is an appropriate measure that 
can differentiate strategic investment choices and resultant competitive position. The 
INVEST variable is calculated as all investments other than U.S. government securities 
and investment grade corporate securities, divided by the aggregate o f U.S. government 
securities and investment grade corporate securities.
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Performance variables. Measures reflecting financial as well as operational 
performance were used in this study. The use o f multiple measures o f performance has 
been advocated for some time (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986), but much 
configurational research has continued to use single or equivocal performance measures. 
For instance, multiple performance measures have been used to assess the strategy- 
performance relationship in the insurance industry (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990), but 
these measures relied heavily on market share, a variable o f questionable value in 
assessment o f financial performance since it is not highly correlated with profitability 
(Hatten and Hatten, 1987).
Insurance regulators are quintessential̂  concerned with insurer solvency (Kimball, 
1962), and have developed the Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS). These 
eleven financial ratios are designed to assist regulators in early identification o f potentially 
troubled insurers, and are readily available measures o f insurer financial condition 
(Huebner, Black and Webb, 1996). Three IRIS ratios appropriate for this study are 1) 
investment yield to measure economic performance, as well as 2) change in premiums and 
3) change in surplus to measure operational performance.
Variations on two other IRIS ratios are included in the current study as measures 
o f leverage (LEVER) and reinsurance activity (REIN), representing finance and 
production measures o f resource deployment, respectively. While the remaining IRIS 
ratios are useful in other capacities, they are not direct measures o f annual firm 
performance. For instance, four IRIS ratios represent multi-year financial results, which 
would confound annual performance assessments. However, two o f these are essentially
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multi-year measures o f the loss and expense ratios, which are used in this study to assess 
economic performance. Two other HUS ratios essentially capture short-term accounting 
measures akin to the current ratio and receivables from agents, both o f which are 
inappropriate in an annual assessment o f performance. Rationale for usage and definitions 
o f the five performance variables follow.
Loss ratio (LOSSRA'D. Loss settlements, and related loss adjustment expenses 
which are only incurred in the event o f losses, are integral to insurer underwriting 
operations. Underwriting, the process o f accepting or rejecting prospective loss 
exposures offered by policyholders, is the fundamental raison d 'etre for any insurer. In 
most instances, the lion's share o f premiums received by an insurer are paid back out in 
honoring valid policyholder claims for losses. The loss ratio provides a measure o f the 
relative success o f an insurer in attaining an overall profitable distribution among all 
exposures accepted, which is crucial to long run firm survival. The loss ratio is calculated 
as the percentage o f losses and loss adjustment expenses to net premiums earned.
Expense ratio (EXRATIO). The ratio o f underwriting expenses to net premiums 
written reflects, among others, administrative expenses, commissions, and a contingency 
for profit. Under statutory accounting principles established by the NAIC, most expenses 
must be recognized when a policy is written or renewed. The expense ratio is a critical 
measure o f performance widely used in the insurance industry because it reflects an 
organization's ability to adequately manage operational expenses (M iller and Mirante,
1994). Expense ratio is calculated as underwriting expenses divided by net premiums 
written.
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Investment yield (YIELDS Insurance is a contingent risk contract for which the 
insured pays in advance. Funds are available for investment purposes by the insurance 
company from receipt o f premiums until claim payout, with investment earnings used to 
supplement underwriting results. Thus, investment yield is an important element o f firm 
performance in the industry (M iller and Mirante, 1994). Investment yield is calculated as 
net investment income divided by the aggregate o f average cash and investment assets.
Change in premiums (CHG .P1 Change in premium volume is an important 
operational measure because it reflects the growth and mix o f insurer operations. Growth 
that is too rapid can easily exceed the requisite asset support or capacity o f any firm, and 
this problem is especially important to insurers due to their fiduciary obligation to their 
policyholders (Anderson and Formisano, 1988). Hence, insurer growth is somewhat 
constrained by statutory requirements that protect policyholder interests. When new 
business is written, statutory accounting procedures require recognition o f all associated 
expenses o f generating that business, while revenues are deferred whenever possible to 
more closely match the actual temporal provision o f risk transfer services. The resultant 
increase in expenses coupled with reduced revenue recognition creates a shortfall that 
must be resolved through decreasing available surplus (equity). Change in premiums is 
calculated as net premiums written in the current year minus net premiums written in the 
prior year, difference divided by net premiums written in the prior year.
Change fa surplus fCHG S I Policyholders' surplus represents the difference 
between the asset base and liability obligations o f an insurer. This terminology is meant 
to reinforce the concept that surplus exists primarily to guarantee insurer solvency so that
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contractual obligations to policyholders are met. Surplus is initially obtained from capital 
contributions by those principals seeking to engage in the business o f insurance, and later 
from the profitable conduct o f that business over time. The purpose o f surplus is to 
protect against operational losses and/or declines in investment values, to fund any 
deficiency in liability reserves, to finance future growth o f the company, and to meet any 
other adverse contingency including guaranty fund obligations imposed by regulators due 
to the failure o f other insurers. Thus, change in surplus is an important operational 
performance measure as it represents a culmination o f past and current strategic decisions. 
Change in surplus is calculated as the adjusted surplus in the current year minus the 
adjusted surplus in the prior year, all over adjusted surplus in the prior year.
Statistical Analyses
Clustering procedures. In order to investigate the research questions, the 
following procedure was followed to assess the property/casualty firms for the year under 
study, 1996. Whether standardization o f the variables is necessary is an equivocal issue 
(Ketchen and Shook, 1996), so initial hierarchical and k-means analysis was performed 
using both standardized and unstandardized data. The later produced unstable clusters 
with ill-defined boundaries. This was primarily determined by observing that when the 
cluster centroids from the hierarchical step were used to set seeds for the k-means step, 
the resulting clusters were very uneven, an unlikely occurrence when using Ward's method 
(Hair et al., 199S), the method o f choice in this study. When this process was repeated 
using varying numbers o f potential dusters, the same result occurred, but there was no 
pattern in which firms remained together.
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Another potential problem with using unstandardized data is that most distance 
measures commonly employed in cluster analysis (e.g., Euclidean) are very sensitive to 
differing scales, with variables having larger standard deviations contributing more heavily 
and influencing final similarity values (Hair et al., 1995). The raw data in this study 
contained some variables with small values (e.g., PPERSJ, but also ones with large values 
(e.g., SIZE). Implicit weighting o f the variables was eliminated by employing Z-scores 
o f the variables, thus standardized variables were used in the analysis. The exceptions are 
for the variables OWNER and AGENCY, where standardization was not appropriate due 
to their binary nature.
A two-step approach (i.e., hierarchical and k-means) was employed because it 
minimizes bias that may be introduced by using a single approach and is recommended in 
assessing clusters (Ketchen and Shook, 1996). Several hierarchical clustering techniques 
are available, each with appropriate usage venues (Hair et al., 1995). A  review o f the 
various methods (see Hair et al., 1995) and o f previously published strategic groups 
literature employing cluster analysis (see Ketchen and Shook, 1996 for a review) revealed 
Ward's method to be the most appropriate for the task at hand. Ward's method minimizes 
within-cluster differences, thus, employing this method provides the most conservative 
framework for exploring the research questions, which focus on within-cluster differences.
The number o f clusters to be considered was decided using both visual inspections 
o f tree plots and agglomeration schedules. Visual inspection o f tree plots is a commonly 
used method o f determining the appropriate number o f clusters (e.g., M ies, Snow and 
Sharfinan, 1993; Ketchen, Thomas and Snow, 1993), and was a hierarchical technique
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used here (i.e., analyzing dendrogram structure created using Ward's method). Analysis 
o f the dendrogram revealed three clusters.
L i addition, agglomeration schedules were constructed in order to review changes 
in cluster sum o f squares. Large jumps are associated with the joining o f two very 
different clusters. Table 1.3 shows that a large jump (22%) occurs when going from one 
to two dusters, thus a two cluster solution should be considered, followed by a three 
cluster solution (17% jump), and four and five cluster solutions (13%). Referring back 
to the dendrogram, a two cluster solution would potentially have only fourteen firms in 
one group and the remaining firms in the other, which would have provided very little  in 
the way o f meaningful comparisons. The dendrogram revealed that a four cluster solution 
was less desirable than a three cluster solution because o f the potentially small “N”  in one 
group. A five cluster solution was not readily evident in the dendrogram. Thus, the three 
duster solution proposed by the 17% jump again appeared the logical choice, and was 
used in the rest o f this analysis. Since Ward's method is considered to be greatly affected 
by outliers (Ketchen and Shook, 1996), the above procedure was repeated using the 
centroid method, which is less affected by outliers (Hair et al., 1995).
Examination o f the various hierarchical results indicated five potential outliers. A 
doser examination o f their data indicated business patterns had changed abruptly during 
the year under study from prior year's business activity, or the firm engaged soldy in a 
very narrow focus. For instance, General Electric is not a primary insurer and sold only 
mortgage insurance. These firms were labded as extreme outliers not representative o f the
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population. Analysis o f such firms often requires qualitative analysis, which is beyond the 
scope o f this paper. Thus, these outliers were dismissed from further analysis.
Table 13
Agglomeration Coefficient Table 





Percent Change in 











Inclusion o f outliers in cluster analysis likely substantially distorts clusters and 
makes the results not representative o f the true population (Hair et al., 1995). Strategic 
group theory recognizes that outliers sometimes exist, but since the concept includes 
finding consensus, or similarity, in competitive approaches, inclusion o f outliers so distorts 
the analyses that they are seldom, if  ever, included in such strategic group analysis. The 
process o f analyzing the dendrogram structure and agglomeration schedule was repeated 
for the remaining 95 firms, and a three cluster solution emerged.
The second phase o f the process involved k-means, or nonhierarchical analysis, 
which produces results considered more robust than their hierarchical counterparts for two
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reasons. First, the initial cluster centers can be taken from the first step 
(hienrchical/Ward's) for a predetermined number o f dusters, thereby eliminating problems 
associated with random seed setting (Ketchen and Shook, 1996; Hair et al., 199S). Also, 
the k-means process allows multiple passes through the data that permit firms to change 
dusters, whereas hierarchical processes do not allow cluster changes once membership 
is assigned. Although the questions explored revolve around within cluster variations, it 
was first necessary to confirm cluster authenticity. Thus, a two-step method (i.e., 
hierarchical, then k-means) was used to determine that a three cluster solution was stable 
across the sample. Once dusters were established and verified, analysis o f variance 
(ANOVA) was used to identify significant strategic profile differences across the identified 
groups. Multiple analysis o f variance (MANOVA) was then used to test differences in 
performance variables across the identified dusters. In essence, significance tests with 
variables not used in the clustering algorithm were performed, which is a robust method 
for validating clusters (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984), constituting another internal 
validity test o f the clustering process.
ANOVA was employed to determine whether significant differences existed 
between the core, periphery and fringe zone strategic profiles, as determined by scope o f 
operations and resource deployment variables within each strategic group. Multivariate 
analysis o f variance (MANOVA) was then conducted across the core, periphery and fringe 
zones o f each strategic group, with performance measures as the dependent variables. 
Bonferronipost hoc tests were conducted to establish pairwise significant differences (i.e., 
across core-periphery-fringe zones) when MANOVA results were significant.
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RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Pearson zero-ordered correlations among the variables used to determine scope 
o f operation, resource deployment and performance are presented in Table 1.4. A visual 
inspection o f each o f the three groups o f variables was executed to identify variable pairs 
with high correlation, since inclusion o f both variables could result in the same factor in 
effect being counted twice, with subsequent work being less parsimonious. The highest 
correlation was .56, well below the suggested .90 where substantial collinearity may be 
indicated (Hair et al., 1995), hence all remained in the rest o f the analysis.
Ouster Interpretations
Application ofthe non-hierarchical (k-means) clustering method reveals significant 
differences across the three identified clusters (strategic groups), with overall Wilks 
lambda F-19.056, p< 000. Nine o f the eleven scope o f operations and resource 
deployment variables are significantly different (ofthe nine, lowest F>3.747, p< 027), as 
reported in Table 1.5. There were no significant differences across the three clusters on 
PPROP, the proportion o f premiums generated from property insurance, or REIN, a 
measure o f reinsurance activity. Overall, one scope o f operations and one resource 
deployment variable was not significantly different across the three identified clusters.
Strategic group competitive profile comparisons based on the scope o f operations 
and resource deployment variables found in the non-hierarchical step follow. To facilitate 
logical discussion o f detected relationships, the order w ill be Cluster 2, Cluster 3 and
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Variables 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A. Scope of Operations
1. Pcnonal Lines
2, Property Products .19
3. Financial Products -.56 -.12
4. Line Diversity -.40 .19 .39
5. Size -.23 -.17 .17 .15
6. Ownership Form -39 .05 .35 .39 .00
7. Ace -37 -.02 .18 .33 .34 .05
B. Retonrce Deployment
S. Afency -.25 .28 .19 .44 -.02 .44 .33
9. Rcinsuiuce .25 .11 -.37 -.21 -.08 -34 .02 -.01
10. Levetefe .45 .18 -.18 -.19 -.31 -.10 -.20 -.04 .06
11. Investment Mix -31 -.15 .11 .06 .20 .02 39 .14 .09 -.31
Performance-Economic
12. Lon Ratio -.09 -.12 -.14 -.11 .11 -.18 .16 .04 .12 -.06 -.02
13. Expense Ratio -.39 .42 .42 .54 -.01 36 35 .46 -.28 -.03 .02 -.17
14. Investment Yield -.17 .02 -.02 -.04 -.19 .14 .02 .19 -.04 .02 35 .09
Performance-Operational
IS. Chanfe in Premiums -.10 .07 .03 .07 -.11 .08 .30 .13 .11 .11 .18 .05






•  11 -.02
N ■ 95. A ll correlations > .20 are significant at p < .05; a ll correlations > .26 significant at p < .01; a ll correlations > .33 significant at p < .001.
Table 1.5
Nonhierarchical Ouster Analysis Profiles
Value Exact F DF Error DF Sig. ofF









PPERS .0630 .9167 1.3217 .2747 -.6882 .4581 39.582 .000
PPROP .0301 .9912 .1466 1.0355 .0612 .7549 .102 .903
PFNAN -.1338 .1474 .2389 .0062 .0790 .1645 6.980 .002
DIVER .1283 .8325 -.8466 .6652 .6721 .2226 24.961 .000
SIZE -.0720 .9709 -.6206 .8877 .5918 .7985 9.313 .000
OWNER .6200 .4900 .4400 .5100 .9600 .2000 7.802 .001
AGE -.3039 .6028 -.6679 .6132 1.2567 .9033 53.023 .000
AGENCY .3600 .4800 .2200 .4300 .9200 .2800 17.589 .000
REIN -.1369 .7238 .1486 .4396 -.1188 .5142 1.444 .241
LEVER -.3713 .6576 1.4600 .7897 -.2267 .5491 53.892 .000


















LOSSRAT -.1214 1.1267 -.0150 .6452 .2791 .8910 1.337 .268
EXRATIO -.0760 .8659 -.5388 .7596 .4099 .5897 7.619 .001
YIELD -.0100 1.1146 .0469 .6045 .1579 .8053 .251 .779
CHG_P -.1233 .2439 -.0150 .2678 .2972 1.9829 1.422 .247
CHG_S -.0800 .5224 .4751 1.9718 -.2689 .6146 3.150 .048
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finally Cluster 1. Each cluster w ill be named based upon the primaiy competitive 
characteristics displayed.
The eighteen firms in Cluster 2 are labeled “Partisans” . Firms in the cluster 
possess an almost single-minded approach to championing the cause o f their followers 
(i.e., providing coverage to their owner/investors). This cluster contains mostly non-stock 
(e.g., mutual) insurers who are, on average, somewhat younger than firms in the other two 
clusters. Direct writers, typically utilizing distribution via exclusive agency, dominate this 
rather highly leveraged cluster. Partisans tend to exhibit low overall line diversity and be 
more narrowly focused in their operations (e.g., auto). The insurers in this cluster exhibit 
greater relative conservatism with respect to their investment portfolio and strategy.
The twenty-four firms in Cluster 3 are perhaps best described by the label “White 
Collars”  because o f their propensity to write business to large commercial firms. They 
also are described as typically old, big, stock companies, which further illustrates the 
appropriateness o f the label. The White Collars group contains the highest concentration 
o f stock insurers and these insurers are, on average, somewhat larger than the firms in the 
other clusters. Furthermore, the agency, or indirect, distribution system characterizes this 
cluster o f relatively older firms. Insurers in this cluster exhibit the greatest relative line 
diversity, with proportionately less emphasis on personal lines and higher emphasis on 
liability, financial and commercial lines. These firms also tend to exhibit lower financial 
leverage coupled with a conservative investment strategy.
Finally, Cluster 1 contained fifty-four firms and was labeled the “Main Streeters” , 
primarily because o f their proclivity to write policies for small-to-moderate businesses,
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such as proprietorships or closely-hdd companies. Main Streeter characteristics fall 
generally between the Partisans and the White Collars along most measures. Main 
Streeters are average in terms o f relative age and size. These insurers tend to be direct 
writers who exhibit moderate overall line diversity with significant commercial lines 
operations. A large number o f mutuals populate this group, and all ofthe original sample 
insurers that specialize in reinsurance are associated with this cluster. This would explain 
why there is no significant difference across all three strategic group clusters on the 
reinsurance activity variable (REIN).
Performance Differences. Table l.S also reports the overall MANOVA using 
Wilks Lambda. In general, performance differences across the three identified clusters are 
significant at the .01 level (i.e., all F>2.527, p< 007). An analysis o f univariate statistics 
ofthe performance variables show the expense ratio (EXRATIO, F>7.61909, p<.001)and 
change in surplus (CHGS, F>3.14952, p<048) measures are driving this overall 
significance, with the loss ratio (LOSSRAT, F> 1.337, p<.268), yield (YIELD, F>.25060, 
p<.779), and change in premiums (CHG_P, F>1.42183, p<.247) being insignificantly 
different across the three groups.
However, common estimates o f performance, such as those used here, can be 
misleading in strategic group analysis in that variables explaining performance can vary 
by group (Hatten, Schendel and Cooper, 1978). Further analysis presented and discussed 
later in this paper indicates that yield and change in premiums also appear as variables 
important in explaining specific strategic group performance. Another potential factor o f 
interest in explaining strategic group performance is degree o f coupling (Lawless and
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Tegarden, 1991). Groups that exhibit tighter coupling, indicating greater conformity, 
were better predictors o f performance. Since degree o f coupling varied across strategic 
groups, ability to uncover evidence o f performance differences may also have varied.
In summary, the k-means analysis indicates that all ofthe strategy variables except 
PPROP and REIN were statistically different across the three identified clusters. Thus, 
the variables chosen were in fact representative o f property/casualty strategic competitive 
profile characteristics proficient in delineating strategic group boundaries in the 
property/casualty sector o f the insurance industry. These results are consistent with the 
existence ofstrategic groups within the sample o f interest, and represent a necessary initial 
step before investigation o f intra-strategic group differences, around which our research 
revolves.
Profiling the clusters involves using variables not included in the clustering process 
to describe the characteristics o f the cluster (Hair et al.t 199S). In most strategic group 
work, including the current research, performance variables are used to profile the 
clusters. In this step, MANOVA results confirm significant performance differences 
across the three identified clusters, but only for the expense ratio and change in surplus 
variables.
Degree of Coupling
In order to examine differences within each cluster, distance from the group mean 
was used to determine whether a particular firm fell within the first, second or third 
standard deviation from the mean. Specifically, categorization by standard deviation is a 
common statistical practice and was used here to assign strategic group segment
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membership, then differences across these strategic group zones were assessed. 
Membership in the group core was determined to be those firms within the first standard 
deviation o f the cluster centroid, firms within the second standard deviation range were 
labeled as the periphery zone, and those firms falling in the third standard deviation range 
considered to be the fringe zone.
Figure 1.1 reports the initial results ofthe clustering process, including the mean 
and standard deviation both across and within the three identified strategic groups, and 
the percentage o f firms that fall within the first, second, and third standard deviation from 
the overall cluster centroid. Figure 1.1 also reveals that core densities, as measured by 
standard deviation o f core firms, are about the same across the three groups. However, 
overall densities are not the same. For instance, the standard deviations for the periphery 
and fringe are larger for the Main Streeters than their two counterparts.
Results o f the segmentation process show the core o f the Main Streeters contains 
approximately 81% ofthe firms in that group, the periphery holds another 11%, and the 
fringe the last 8% o f firms in the group. The Partisans group distribution o f firms is 78% 
for the core, and 11% for both the periphery and fringe. The White Collars group consists 
o f 71%, 21% and 8% firm membership respectively in the three zones. The Main 
Streeters group has a large number o f its members within the core, which potentially 
indicates the relative ease with which firms imitate each other, or perhaps difficulties 
encountered in exiting the core. In other words, firms here experience a high degree o f 
coupling, which likely indicate mobility barrier influence.
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Following this logic, the White Collars are more loosely coupled, with only 71% 
o f membership in the core and the remaining 29% in either the periphery or the fringe. 
Thus, it may be easier for firms to move out o f and/or tougher to move into the core zone 
o f the Main Streeters than o f the White Collars. The Partisans appears to fall between the 
Main Streeters and the White Collars relative to coupling o f the core. Now that intra­
group differences have been identified, perhaps further analysis in a longitudinal study 
could help determine if  some groups experience higher entry barriers, while other groups 
may experience higher exit barriers. Table 1.6 lists strategic group membership by zone - 
first core, then periphery and finally fringe.
Intra-group strategic profiles. Table 1.7-1.9 report ANOVA for strategic 
profiles as assessed by scope o f operations and resource deployment variables, as well as 
by performance variables, for each o f the three identified clusters. Zones within each 
cluster are detailed as follows: core (zone I), periphery (zone 2), and fringe (zone 3). 
Each table depicts one cluster and presents ANOVA results o f tests for differences in 
means between the core, periphery and fringe zones o f that particular cluster. Significant 
differences on any variable would suggest asymmetry among the firms in the periphery or 
fringe relative to the core. That is, statistically significant differences from the core mean 
indicates that firms in these zones are on average either consistently above or below the 
value associated with the core. Perfect symmetry about the core mean would produce no 
significant differences across zones for a particular variable. Overall, it appears that some 
strategic profile and performance variables are stable (/.«., no significant difference) within 
a particular strategic group, while others are significantly different Table 1.10 reports
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Table 1.7
Hierarchical Ouster Profile of "Main Streeters*1 Group Zoues
Value Exact F DF Error DF Sic. ofF 
Wilks .133 6.331 22 SO XMO
Care Periphery Friaae
(N -43)___________ (F K T _________ (N -l)
Strategy
Variable Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D.
FB.̂ 39
PPERS -.0370 .9078 1818 .6082 -.6387 1.315 1125 .302
PPROP -.0560 .7373 .9064 .8093 -.9006 2.3708 4.729 .013*
PFNAN -.1192 .1583 -.1729 .0640 •1316 .0211 1.317 177
DIVER 1846 .4843 .4765 .4010 -2.0743 1.1828 36.655 .000*
SIZE -.1614 .7666 .1043 1.4219 .6293 1.9771 1.343 170
OWNER .6000 .4900 1.00 .0000 1500 .5000 3127 .048*
AGE -16S9 .6141 -.6212 .3910 •1366 .7316 .939 .398
AGENCY .3300 .4700 .6700 .5200 1500 .5000 1.439 147
REIN -.2376 .6752 .3119 1.0710 1713 .1329 2.317 .109
LEVER -.3606 .6568 -.1834 .7555 -.7690 .4120 .981 .382
INVEST -.1116 .0260 -.0570 .0493 -.3600 .1228 9.763 .000*
Value 
Wilks .667










Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D.
F
Ratio 39
LOSSRAT -.1401 1.1054 -.6067 .7689 .8069 1.5116 1.997 .146
EXRATIO -.0290 .8557 .3652 .4320 -11463 .43395 5125 .009*
YIELD -.0770 .9796 -.4111 .7263 1112 2.1213 3.613 .034*
CHG_P -.1257 1240 .0930 .3293 -.1423 1813 .059 .943
CHG_S -.1010 .5143 .0059 .5774 .0888 .6388 .343 .711
* Significant pairwise profile and perfonnance differences are displayed in Table 1.10
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Table 1.8
Hierarchical Ouster Profile o f“Partisans”  Group Zones
Value Exact F DF ErrorDF Sig. ofF  




Variable Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D. Mean S.D.
F
Ratio St
PPERS 1.4171 .0722 1.0256 .7004 .9505 .3835 6.148 .011*
PPROP -.1392 .4213 -.4595 .5607 2.7545 .3553 42.251 .000*
PFNAN -.2401 .0454 -.2317 .0148 -.2373 .0068 1.845 .192
DIVER -.7376 .3490 -.5156 1.3518 -.1940 1.1546 4.390 .032*
SIZE -.6944 .6594 -.9727 1.2683 .2482 2.0740 1.190 .331
OWNER .5000 .5200 .5000 .7100 .0000 .0000 .883 .454
AGE -.7139 .5667 -.3327 1.1388 -.6813 .8158 .311 .737
AGENCY .2100 .4300 .5000 .7100 .0000 .0000 .667 .528
REIN .1163 .4845 .1091 .2513 .4149 .1033 .383 .688
LEVER 1.448 .7067 2.0926 .9496 .9101 1.3422 1.147 .344
INVEST -.1189 .0236 -.1194 .0010 -.1288 .0203 .169 .846
Value 
Wilks .320






Variable Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D.
F
Ratio St
L05SRAT -.0028 .5903 -.2622 1.4408 .1497 .5404 .194 .826
EXRATIO -.6535 .8168 -.3446 .1198 .0702 .3452 .853 .446
YIELD -.0200 .6024 .6985 .4398 -.1332 .5694 1.401 271
CHG_P -.0590 .2458 -.0620 .6456 -.0890 .0654 .077 .926
CHGJS .1298 .6648 -.3054 1.756 3.6727 5.8248 4.093 .038*
* Significant pairwise profile and performance differences are displayed in Table 1.10
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Tabic 1.9
Hierarchical Quxter Profile of “White Collars” Group Zones
Value Exact F DF Error DF Sic. ofF
Wilks .312 .791 22 22 707
Periphery Friaae
( ifrS )_________ (N-2)
Strateay
Variable Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D.
F
Ratio St
PPERS -.7079 .4637 -.4422 .4111 -1.135 .0440 1.808 .189
PPROP .0576 .7148 .3572 .4431 -.6481 1.6439 1.301 293
PFNAN •0910 .1859 .0400 .1180 .0780 .0619 .174 .842
DIVER .6779 .1942 .7510 .0995 .4256 .5856 1.631 220
SIZE .6687 .7743 .3768 .7870 .4755 1.4955 .263 .771
OWNER .9400 .2400 1.0000 .0000 1.0000 .0000 .191 .827
AOE 1.1879 .8857 1.1840 .6129 2.0229 1.8527 .769 .476
AGENCY .9400 1400 1.0000 .0000 .5000 .7100 2.857 .080*
REIN -.1786 .4246 -1796 .5340 .7920 .4533 4.589 .022*
LEVER • 2499 .5208 -.0930 .5247 -.3639 1.1648 .210 .812













Variable Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D. Meaa S.D.
F St
LOSSRAT .3934 .9846 -1708 .4145 .6820 .0128 1.334 285
EXRATIO .4426 .5303 .5137 .0849 -.1272 1.6798 2883 .752
YIELD .0753 .6945 .3620 .8302 .3505 2.0107 .9274 .411
CHQJP -.1659 .1751 .0836 .4226 4.7678 6.7371 9.8809 .001*
CHG_S -.1970 .6876 -.4400 .4494 -.4526 .1191 .3776 .690
* Significant pairwise profile andperformance differences are displayed in Table 1.10
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Table 1.10
Pairwise Differences Between 
Core, Periphery and Fringe Zones
Croap_________ Strategic Variable___________ Significant Contrasts
Main Streeters PPROP Periphery > Core* 
Periphery > Fringe**
DIVER Core > Fringe*** 
Periphery > Fringe***
OWNER Periphery > Fringe**
INVEST Fringe > Core** 
Periphery > Core**
Partisans PPERS Core > Periphery* 
Core > Fringe**
PPROP Fringe > Core*** 
Fringe> Periphery***
DIVER Core > Fringe** 
Periphery > Fringe*
White Collars REIN Fringe > Core** 
Fringe > Periphery**
INVEST Fringe > Core* 
Fringe > Periphery*
AGENCY Periphery > Fringe*
Group Performance Variable Significant Contrasts
Main Streeters YIELD Fringe > Core** 
Fringe > Periphery**
EXRATIO Core > Fringe** 
Periphery > Fringe***
Partisans CHG.S Fringe > Core** 
Fringe > Periphery*
White Collars CHG_P Fringe >Core*** 
Fringe > Periphery***
Pairwise performance differences significant at: * * p <  0.10; **-p < .0 5 ; ***« p < .0 1 .
61
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
significant pairwise differences identified among the core, periphery, and fringe zones o f 
each duster.
More specifically, Table 1.7 shows that within the Main Streeters cluster, there are 
significant differences at p < . 10 across the three zones (core, periphery, and fringe), with 
overall Wilks lambda F=6.331, pc.OOO. Three o f the scope o f operations variables and 
one o f the resource deployment variables were significantly different across the identified 
zones: namely, level o f property premiums written (PPROP, F>4.729, p< .013), firm 
diversification (DIVER, F>36.655, p<.000), ownership structure (OWNER, F>3.227, 
p< 048), and type o f investments held (INVEST, F>9.763, pc.OOO), respectively.
Table 1.10 shows, in general, firms in the periphery segment o f the Main Streeters 
are stock companies, with higher levds o f property coverage sales, greater line diversity, 
and more risky investment portfolios (although still considered conservative compared to 
industry norms) than either the core or fringe firms in this cluster. Firms in the fringe zone 
are likdy to be mutually owned and have lower levels o f property coverage sales and line 
diversity than firms in the periphery and higher levels o f investment portfolio risk relative 
to the core. By comparison, the core segment falls somewhere between the fringe and 
periphery on each o f the four significantly different measures. A ll other strategic profile 
variables were stable across the Main Streeters cluster.
Figures 1.2-1.4 provide detailed information on each strategic group. Figure 1.2 
presents depictions o f all 11 scope and resource deployment variables, as well as the five 
performance variables, across the periphery and fringe zones o f the Main Streeters group. 
For each segment, the y-axis represents the distance from the core mean on each o f the
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variables o f interest. In other words, zero represents the core mean on each variable. 
Each o f the six parts ofFigure 1.2 has its own y-scale, therefore the parts are not readily 
comparable to each other. These depictions provide additional insight into character o f 
the periphery and fringe firms by revealing the degree o f similarity among firms in the 
same segment, as well as those variables on which the firms exhibit little  commonality.
Firms within each o f the Main Streeter periphery and fringe zones tended to exhibit 
similar levels on the variables o f interest relative to the core. The principal exception was 
size. Intra-zone variation on size was large for both the periphery and fringe and the 
values appeared to be symmetrical about the core mean. Interestingly, there is more 
similarity among the periphery firms than the fringe firms on the scope measures, while 
the opposite is true for the resource deployment dimension. Four firms in the periphery 
segment (Cincinnati Insurance Company -10677, General Accident Insurance - 21970, 
Safeco Insurance - 24740 and Continental Insurance - 3S289) look very similar on all 
scope dimensions. A ll firms in the periphery except Virginia Surety (40827) look very 
similar on resource deployment.
As for the location o f fringe firms, relative to those in the periphery, the periphery 
members are above the strategic group average on PPROP, while all the fringe members, 
are very near the core average on PPROP and PFNAN. A ll the periphery firms are stock 
firms while the fringe firms tend to be mutually owned. Most periphery firms have above 
average levels o f diversification (DIVER), while the fringe firms are all below average. 
Three o f four fringe firms also exhibit below average levels o f leverage (LEVER) and 
personal sales (PPERS). A ll in all, Main Streeter fringe and periphery firms appear to
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constitute fairly tightly coupled intra-group segments that are roughly positioned on 
opposite sides o f the core.
The Partisans differ significantly across the core, periphery and fringe zones, with 
overall Wilks lambda F - 10.089, p< 000. A ll three significantly different variables are 
scope o f operations related, and included the level o f personal premiums written (PPERS, 
F>6.148, p<.011), level o f property premiums written (PPROP, F>42.251, p<.000), and 
diversity o f product lines (DIVER, F>4.390, p<032) variables (see Table 1.8). Although 
the Partisans have high levels o f personal lines in general, the core exhibits this most 
clearly (see Table 1.10). While the cluster generally has little line diversity, the core shows 
the least. The fringe has the greatest level o f property coverage sales. A ll other strategic 
profile variables were stable across the Partisans cluster.
Figure 1.3 presents depictions o f all 11 scope and resource deployment variables 
across the periphery and fringe zones o f the Partisans group. With only two firms in the 
periphery and two in the fringe, the degree o f similarity may be especially sensitive to 
idiosyncratic factors. That said, the two fringe firms appear to be more similar to each 
other than the two periphery firms. The two fringe firms are markedly different on only 
two variables (size and leverage), while the periphery firms are located on opposite sides 
o f the core mean for five variables (diversification, owner, age, agency and reinvestment). 
As for the location o f fringe firms relative to those in the periphery, fringe and periphery 
firms tend to be on opposite sides o f the core mean for the scope variables, but on the 
same side o f the core mean for the resource deployment measures.
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The White Collar cluster zones do not differ significantly across the three zones, 
with overall Wilks lambda at F=.791, p<707. However, three variables, all resource 
deployment, showed significant differences across the zones. These were type o f 
distribution system (AGENCY, F>2.857, p< 080), level o f reinsurance (REIN, F>4.589, 
p<.022) and type o f investments (INVEST, F>3.090, p< 067). Tables 1.9 and 1.10 
demonstrate the periphery segment is exclusively occupied by firms with an agency 
distribution system who exhibit lower relative reinsurance activity, while the fringe exhibit 
higher levels o f reinsurance activity. A ll other strategic profile variables were stable across 
the cluster.
Figure 1.4 presents depictions o f all 11 scope and resource deployment variables 
across the periphery and fringe zones o f the White Collar group. In general, the firms in 
the periphery appear similar in scope and resource deployment, particularly for PPROP, 
OWNER, AGENCY, and INVEST. In contrast, the fringe firms exhibit less similarity, 
but conclusions are again difficult because only two firms are located here. Interestingly, 
fringe and periphery firms tend to be located on the same side o f the core mean. A ll o f 
the periphery and fringe firms are stock firms, are above the group average on PPROP 
activity, have very similar levels o f diversification (DIVER), and very low levels on the 
PFNAN variable. Most are also below the group average on PPERS activity.
In sum, the degree o f intra-group segmentation varies from group to group. It 
appears the Main Streeters group makes the strongest case for the existence o f meaningful 
intra-group segments. This is also the group with the largest N (core = 43, periphery *  
6, fringe -  4), perhaps allowing a clearer picture o f intra-group segments to emerge.
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Intra-group segments are least evident in the Partisans group (also the smallest 
group) where firms in the periphery (N=2) and fringe (N=2) appear nearly symmetrical 
about the core mean. The White Collars group falls somewhere between the other two 
in that segmentation appears somewhat obvious in the periphery zone (N=5), but not the 
fringe (N-2). The ability to detect intra-group segments may be influenced in this study 
by low N in certain parts. It is also worth noting that while the fringe and periphery zones 
associated with the Main Streeters group tend to be on opposites o f their core mean, those 
associated with the White Collars group tend to be arrayed on the same side o f their core. 
Thus, the periphery and fringe firms associated with the Main Streeters appear to form 
two distinct segments with very different profiles, while those associated with the White 
Collars may actually be one very loosely coupled segment o f firms spread across the 
dividing line arbitrarily used in the current study to distinguish fringe from periphery firms.
An analysis o f the dimensions (scope and resource deployment) as a whole across 
the three identified groups provides more insight into potential intra-group patterns. Of 
particular note is the pattern o f dimension importance in determining significant intra­
group differences across the three strategic groups. For the Partisans, all differences 
appeared in the scope o f operations variables (PPERS, PPROP and DIVER). Similarly, 
three o f the four intra-group differences for the Main Streeters (PPROP, DIVER, and 
OWNER) fe ll in the scope dimension. This appears to indicate that the scope dimension 
is where more variety is found, or allowed, in sectors o f the property/casualty market 
serving mainly individuals and small businesses (i.e.. Main Streeters) and for the Partisans, 
who excel in personal sales on property coverage. This may be due to the many
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opportunities firms hive to engage in either broad spectrum or niche marketing across 
both personal and commercial lines.
Conversely, the White Collars (old, stock companies selling mainly commercial 
coverage) have more options in resource deployment, in that all significant differences fell 
within this dimension (AGENCY, REIN and INVEST). The White Collars are stock 
companies with greater access to capital markets, and therefore potentially more leverage. 
Since most o f the large dollar volume o f risk is associated with this group, it is therefore 
more likely to seek options in reinsurance activity. This in effect helps spread these large 
risks, thereby freeing firm assets and allowing more premiums to be written. The primary 
distribution channel for personal property coverage is through direct writers, whereas 
commercial property coverage is primarily distributed through agents and brokers. The 
potential advantages o f the agency system is greater market penetration, accounting for 
some portion o f competitive advantage. Therefore it is more likely that firms in this group 
would seek distribution options. A longitudinal analysis is necessary to explore whether 
these variables are important in explaining intra-group mobility barriers o f strategic change 
options.
Performance implications. Table 1.7-1.9 also report intra-cluster differences 
across the performance variables for the three clusters. Overall MANOVA shows that 
there are significance performance differences across the core, periphery and fringe zones 
for the Main Streeters (F=2.064, p<035) and White Collars (F=3.538, p< 003), but not 
for the Partisans (overall Wilks lambda F=1.688, p<147).
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With respect to specific performance outcomes, the Main Streeters exhibit 
significant intra-group differences for the expense ratio (EXRATIO, F>5.225, p,.009) and 
yield (YIELD, F>3.613, p<.034) measures across the core, periphery and fringe zones. 
The fringe firms outperform both the core and periphery with respect to both yield and 
loss ratio. The White Collar fringe exhibited a higher change in premium (CHG_P, 
F>9.881, p< 001) than either the core or periphery zones. For Partisans, a single 
performance variable, change in surplus (CHG_S, F>4.093, p<.038), is significantly 
different across the three zones, with the fringe zone again being significantly higher than 
the core or periphery zones.
Figures 1.2-1.4 present performance measures on the five variables o f overall 
interest for the periphery and fringe for the Main Streeters, Partisans and White Collars 
respectively. Again the Main Streeters segment exhibited considerable within segment 
homogeneity, with each segment tending to score on opposite rides o f the core mean for 
the measures o f interest. In contrast, the Partisans exhibit the least intra-segment 
homogeneity on the performance measures, while the White Collars exhibited more 
similarity among the periphery than fringe firms.
The second research question asks whether significant intra-group performance 
differences exist. The answer is yes. Core, periphery and fringe members within a 
strategic group do perform differently on average, although the specific performance 
measures that reveal statistically significant differences varies by cluster. Interestingly, 
there also appears to be some correspondence in the degree o f intra-segment homogeneity 
among the strategy and performance variables. The Main Streeter fringe and periphery
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firms not only had the most intra-segment homogeneity among the scope and resource 
deployment variables, they also exhibited the greatest homogeneity in performance.
DISCUSSION
Little extant literature discusses the importance o f empirical validity and utility o f 
intra-strategic group variations. The present study provides a more fine-grained analysis 
o f the strategic groups concept by examining the degree o f segmentation within strategic 
groups in the insurance industry and exploring the link between zone affiliation and firm 
performance. The findings have several theoretical and methodological implications that 
are discussed below.
As expected, analysis o f the difference between core, periphery, and fringe zones 
within a particular group revealed statistically significant differences across some strategic 
scope o f operations and resource deployment variables, as well as across performance 
variables. We would not expect all o f the strategic variables to differ in a statistically 
significant fashion across the zones o f a given strategic group because the clustering 
algorithm used to create the groups requires some degree o f similarity across the firms in 
one group - that is, there is a reason to group these firms together in the first place. Post 
hoc analysis revealed varying levels o f similarity in firms within each zone, indicating that 
at least some strategic groups may in fact have cores where firms all behave similarly in 
a competitive sense, but also non-core segments - small groups o f firms with similar 
strategic profiles that are distinct from the profiles that characterize their respective cores.
Overall, the Main Streeters group showed the most well-defined intra-group 
segments, Partisans the least well-defined segments. The White Collars fell in the middle
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with a more defined segment in the periphery than the fringe zone o f the cluster. 
However, given the relative position o f periphery and fringe firms in this strategic group, 
these non-core firms may in fact constitute a single loosely coupled segment spanning 
what we arbitrarily label the periphery and fringe zones o f the strategic group.
The presence o f well-defined segments may also indicate that common intra-group 
mobility barriers are at work, creating sets o f rigidities that produce similar strategic 
profiles among non-core firms. Perhaps the loose coupling o f non-core firms with 
strategic group norms identifies niche market approaches protected by such barriers or 
rigidities. In contrast, clusters that lack well defined segments may have less rigid or 
fewer mobility barriers, allowing firms to move freely within their strategic groups.
The present findings indicate that some strategic groups contain segments o f firms 
with common differences from the strategic group profile. Firms in these segments 
generally behave competitively like each other, but different from firms in the core or 
other segments. The stage has been set for future research, particularly as it pertains to 
better understanding o f intragroup differences and their relationship to mobility barriers. 
These intragroup differences indicate that mobility barriers may exist within, as well as 
across, strategic groups, and that these mobility barriers may hinder strategic group 
consensus. These lead to several implications for strategic group research. Only 
longitudinal analysis o f strategic group change could reveal the extent o f mobility barrier 
influence on intra-group coupling or how this, or simply strategic group location, might 
influence movement options.
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Performance differences were noted across zones in two o f the three strategic 
groups, although the particular performance measures where significant differences were 
noted varied by strategic group. This follows closely with the observations o f Hatten, 
Schendel and Cooper (1978) that variables useful in explaining performance vary by 
group, therefore industry level estimates can be misleading for groups and individual firms. 
It appears that the same phenomenon is present in segments found within the strategic 
groups, thus group level estimates could be misleading for segments and firms.
In addition, it appears that the Main Streeters group showed the most intra- 
segment homogeneity on the performance variables, which tracked along with the most 
intra-segment homogeneity on scope and resource deployment variables o f all three 
groups. Thus, it would appear that in strategic groups where segments with distinctive 
strategic competitive profiles can be identified, performance is influenced by that profile.
These findings also give credence to the assertions o f Reger and H uff (1993), and 
Ketchen et al., (1993) that configurations may not be monolithic and should be viewed 
potentially as having multiple segments. The core can be viewed as defining the 
configurations position, with the peripheral firms containing some o f the same key 
dimensions as the core, but differing across others. The fringe firms may also foUow this 
pattern, but are farther removed from the strategic group core. Because non-core firms 
are more loosely coupled to a strategic group's elemental way o f doing business, they may 
be more flexible than their core counterparts and perhaps in unique positions to initiate 
strategic group movement. A  flexible strategic competitive profile may be even more
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germane in a faster-cycle market, as successful firms must rapidly respond to 
environmental pressures.
Future research should address changes in strategic group and zone {i.e., core, 
periphery, fringe) membership over time, and the nature o f events or strategic competitive 
profiles that encourage or impede movement, as well as the resultant performance impact. 
The identification o f profiles for organizations that are likely to change zones or groups 
(/. e., strategic competitive profiles) in the future would potentially have many applications. 
Tracking movements within a core, periphery, or fringe zone might be useful in identifying 
organizations that are presently changing their strategic competitive profile. In general, 
discerning whether the same core-periphery-fringe characteristics are observed in other 
industries, especially longitudinally, would also be insightful.
Additionally, determining which zones are more likely to obtain a sustainable 
competitive advantage might help predict future leaders o f competitive change. We 
should also explore the degree to which each strategic group has zones over time. It is 
possible that some clusters are periodically so tightly coupled on the scope o f operations 
and resource deployment variables that no significant differences exist across the cluster. 
Even if  intra-group zones exist, firms might be symmetrical about the core mean, failing 
to exhibit well-defined segments. Establishing the degree to which zones have identifiable 
segments, especially longitudinally, could also have profound influences on our ability to 
understand the importance o f strategic group membership at varying levels.
These themes seem particularly salient because o f the accelerated level o f 
environmental, regulatory and competitive change recently experienced in the insurance
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industry. In response to these fundamental changes, many insurers reportedly shed 
organizational constraints and transformed themselves into flexible, rapid market-response 
organizations by building upon core competencies and seeking new distribution channels 
and technologies (Rometty and Morrison, 1996). Longitudinal studies o f the 
property/casualty sector o f the insurance industry could potentially provide insight into 
the process involved and the depth o f these transformations.
Future research may also consider whether the core-periphery-fringe relationship 
observed in the property/casualty sector o f the insurance industry is also present in the 
other primary sector, life/health, or in emerging facets o f the insurance industry, such as 
alliances. Such alliances include joint ventures between insurers and banks to sell variable 
life products, outsource many functions, provide private labeling o f products, and explore 
international joint ventures, particularly with regard to start-up operations in developing 
countries (Guinn and Young, 1996).
Some limitations o f the current research should be noted. The degree o f strategic 
homogeneity is an industry specific characteristic related to technology use and, to a 
greater extent, industry growth rate (Chatman and Jehn, 1994). Therefore the results o f 
this study may not hold in other industries. Additionally, the relatively small sample size 
(95) prevented adequate statistical power to detect small differences across and within the 
clusters. The clustering algorithm produced some strategic group zones with only two 
members, with related intra-group comparisons potentially sensitive to idiosyncratic forces 
and o f limited value. Finally, the division o f strategic groups along one, two and three 
standard deviations is only a single example o f the potentially many ways to divide
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strategic groups in search o f intra-group differences. Future researchers may wish to 
explore other methods for dividing strategic groups.
In sum, empirical exploration ofthe nature, behavior, and subsequent implications 
o f group zone membership can potentially reveal much useful information. This includes, 
but is not limited to, identification o f group referents, viable current strategies, indications 
o f possible emergent or future strategies, development o f new sustainable competitive 
advantages, the stability o f strategic groups or zones over time, the existence o f 
meaningful segments, and the influence o f environmental change on these memberships 
and the resultant strategic competitive profile.
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STUDYn
STRATEGIC GROUP DYNAMICS IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY, 
1993-199$: AN INDUCTIVE APPROACH
The strategic groups concept has historically been viewed as providing distinctive 
and meaningful insight into collective rather than individual firm behavior (Miller, 1987). 
In essence, members o f particular strategic groups have similar views ofthe competitive 
environment (Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller, 1989) and adhere to similar strategies 
(Porter, 1979). Conversely, members o f different groups pursue different objectives, have 
different views o f the environment and compete with different strategies (Zahra, 1987). 
Thus, strategic group analysis provides insight into, among other things, the degree o f 
strategic heterogeneity (Harrigan, 1985); the effects o f competitive rivaliy (Cool and 
Dierickx, 1993); definition o f firm competitors (Porter, 1980); reference points for those 
firms designing competitive strategy (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995); and intra-industry 
performance differences (Porter, 1979).
Strategic group studies have traditionally focused on inter-group theoretical 
development and empirical testing, especially o f performance differences [see McGee and 
Thomas (1986), Thomas and Venkatraman (1988), and Ketchen, Thomas and Snow 
(1993) for reviews]. Study I  established three distinct strategic groups in a cross sectional 
sample o f property/casualty insurance firms. I t  also explored wilro-group variation that 
revealed significant differences in both strategic competitive profile and performance 
across core, periphery and fringe zones within strategic groups. Study II o f this series 
extends the analysis by tracking and assessing the performance implications o f strategic
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competitive profile intra and inter-group change and patterns o f firm  movement over time 
through an examination o f 95 firms in the property/casualty sector o f the insurance 
industry for the years 1993-1996. The emergence o f new strategic group competitive 
positions may indicate new ways o f coping with environmental pressures. Additional 
salience may be attached if  other firms mimic the strategic behavior o f first or early 
movers, thus potentially suggesting new definitions o f profitable or legitimate strategic 
behavior. Conversely, the convergence o f strategic competitive profiles would indicate 
a reduction in acceptable or profitable strategic behaviors.
A review ofthe literature on how firms create groups is presented in order to set 
a backdrop for three primary areas o f inquiry. First, whether strategic groups as a whole 
change their competitive profiles over time and relative to other strategic groups is 
examined. Then the level o f cohesiveness, or coupling, over time is investigated through 
analysis o f intra-group variance patterns. Intra-group firm movement culminates in 
strategic group change, thus why some firms might change strategically while others do 
not is o f interest. Third, the activity level (i.e., direction, number and distance o f strategic 
changes) provides a micro look at the performance implications o f strategic group change 
through analysis o f ndividual firm movement across and within strategic groups. Research 
questions germane to strategic change are presented, followed by descriptions o f methods 
and results. Discussion o f the theoretical and practical applications o f the results and 
limitations o f the findings are offered in the final two sections ofthe paper.
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THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
The current research is inductive and descriptive in nature. Intra and into’strategic 
group movement patterns revealed by study o f the sample at hand w ill be interpreted 
through post hoc analysis o f insurance industry events. The literature reviewed below is 
not designed to support traditional hypothesis testing. It is meant to create a theoretical 
framework for interpreting strategic group dynamics in the industry o f interest.
The Dynamics o f Strategic Group Formation
Mimetic isomorphism involves organizations modeling themselves after each other 
through the adoption o f similar strategies, structures, and processes (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Among the stimuli to mimetic isomorphism are the search for higher 
performance and reduced risk. Haveman (1993) found firms tended to imitate other firms 
o f equal or greater size who were viewed as successful, particularly during uncertain times. 
Emulation serves to reduce risks by following strategic plans that have proven successful 
in the given environment. Where widespread, such behavior can lead to a group o f rival 
firms who share views on necessary asset accumulation, look to each other's strategic 
behavior for guidance, and follow similar key strategies (Porter, 1980).
Although isomorphic activity often results in homogeneity among firms, a variety 
ofliteratures also recognize that markets value uniqueness (Porter, 1991;Miles, Snow and 
Sharfman, 1993). The resource based view o f the firm proposes those possessing rare, 
valuable, costly to imitate and non-substitutable resources are most likely capable o f 
maintaining a competitive advantage that can lead to above average returns (Barney, 
1991). Similarly, both the population ecology (e.g., Aldrich and Pfefier, 1976; Hannan
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and Freeman, 1977) and resource dependence (e.g., Van De Ven and Walker, 1984) 
models suggest that environments can only sustain a certain number o f firms and that 
finding *  sustainable niche is important to long term survival. In short, overcrowding 
encourages low-performing firms to seek new territory as a means o f survival. Consistent 
with these views, heterogeneity among firms in an industry has been linked to higher mean 
industry performance (Miles, Snow and Sharfinan, 1993).
Thus industry characteristics, such as heterogeneity in product demand, limit 
isomorphic tendencies and generate varying levels o f sustainable diversity manifested by 
the number o f strategic groups. Once formed, strategic groups tend to be relatively stable 
over time where high levels o f long-term resource commitments are required for strategic 
planning and implementation processes (McGee and Thomas, 1986). High resource 
commitments create mobility barriers and these barriers can be augmented by firm 
interdependency and cooperative behavior among group members designed to keep out 
new entrants. In these environments strategic change tends to be incremental, requiring 
movers to undertake a series o f steps before reaching their desired destinations (Porter,
1980).
Dynamic change in the number o f viable groups within a given competitive space 
is frequently associated with fundamental environmental shifts. These shifts trigger 
changes in some, but generally not all, strategic groups or their defining dimensions 
(Mascarenhas, 1989). In other words, some exogenous shocks are so influential in 
defining acceptable ways o f doing business that some firms or groups may choose to 
reconfigure themselves in order to survive or take advantage o f emerging opportunities.
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Such shocks may jeopardize certain business ventures, provoking firms to migrate to other 
more viable groups. Less protected groups (i.e., those with fewer mobility barriers) are 
more likely targets for entry by such migrating firms, particularly if  firms in the target 
group share some similarities with the migrating firms (Mascarenhas, 1989).
Environmental shocks may also create new opportunities. I f  one or more firms 
within a group chooses a new strategy, then in effect a new strategic group emerges. 
Mascarenhas (1989) observed such a maverick firm in the then-turbulent oil industry that 
defied strategic group and industry competitive norms in pursuit o f an unparalleled 
strategy. This firm maintained higher short term profitability than most o f its original 
group members. Likewise, a new entrant with a novel approach can lead to the emergence 
o f a new strategic group. This is more likely in early industry evolution when higher levels 
o f variety are apparent and obtainable (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fombrun, 1986). 
New entrants may introduce innovative methods and technologies that erode traditional 
market approaches, especially during periods o f growth (Porter, 1985). Maverick firms 
and new entrants, if  successful, can serve as reference points for other firms, becoming the 
basis for more robust strategic groups. Or, new entrants and maverick firms may assume 
untenable positions, leading to the emergence and disappearance o f small strategic groups 
over time (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990).
Given that the insurance industiy environment experienced a number o f exogenous 
shocks during the period under study (Mayewsld et al., 1996), the prospects for 
substantial strategic realignment would appear to be high. Thus, tracing out strategic 
group dynamics in the insurance industry holds the promise o f observing changes in both
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the number and relative position o f entire strategic groups as the industry searches for a 
new competitive balance.
Intra-group Firm Movement and Strategic Group Change
Substantial strategic group movement is the result o f a coordinated realignment o f 
member firms’ strategic competitive positions. When firms anticipate strategic change, 
they often look to the behavior o f others within their competitive environment (Huff, 1982; 
McGee and Thomas, 1986,1989; Huff, H uff and Thomas, 1992). That is, firms within a 
particular strategic group not only resemble each other, but also respond similarly to 
disturbances, accurately anticipate each others actions and generally influence each others 
competitive behavior, particularly as it applies to the pursuit o f higher performance 
(Porter, 1979). A search for higher performance or profit may be a catalyst in strategic 
change as firms often attempt to copy the strategic competitive profile o f those with higher 
performance or viewed as more legitimate (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 199S) or successful 
(Haveman, 1993). These searches w ill most often involve referencing other firms within 
their competitive space (i.e., strategic group) (H uff 1982; H uff H uff and Thomas, 1992).
Conversely, when firms experience favorable performance their searches are fewer, 
more unfocused and their behavior less risky when exploring competitive domains (March,
1981), primarily because they do not want to chance losing past gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979,1982). This may result in less coordinated and more incremental strategic 
adjustments among members o f a group. Similarly, firms are normally not motivated to 
change domains during periods o f growth due to opportunities associated with potentially 
unfulfilled demand within their current domain (Hofer, 1975).
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Thus, low performance by some group members or high uncertainty is likely to 
produce more strategic realignment than growth or widespread favorable economic 
performance. Yet, the nature o f such realignment is difficult to predict. Various 
literatures suggest intra-group firm movement can either be toward or away from the 
group’s historic strategic profile, producing either greater or lesser “coupling.”  The 
institutional literature would suggest greater coupling around core firms. Firms in a 
strategic group core zone have competitive profiles most closely matching that o f their 
particular strategic group (see Study I  for greater details) and firms with higher conformity 
are most likely associated with legitimate approaches (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). Thus, firm movement toward a strategic group core 
is perhaps the most likely response since firms often attempt to copy the strategic 
competitive profile o f others who are viewed as most legitimate (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 
1995). I f  the search for greater profitability is the primary motivator for widespread 
realignment, it too should bring greater coupling around those firms viewed ss most 
profitable within the group. These may or may not be core firms.
However, other literatures suggest firms may decouple - moving away from each 
other and their strategic group core. Strategic balance theory recognizes that the pressures 
o f oligopolistic competition and the desire o f some firms to move away from the masses 
often conflicts with the pressure some firms might feel to be like other firms in order to 
appear legitimate (Deephouse, 1999). In a study o f the Manhattan hotel industry, Baum 
and Haveman (1997) found that new entrants physically located near competitors who 
were similar on pricing, but different on other dimensions, such as size. Hence,
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complementary differences were created and intense localized competition avoided. This 
follows closely with the strategic balance concept that "firms should be as different as 
legitimately possible”  (Deephouse, 1999:148).
More generally, markets become less contestable as strategic distances increase, 
with firms or groups more successful in niche development when distances are great 
(Hatten and Hatten, 1987). In addition, significant differences between industry members 
may not only insulate the industry from new entrants, but may also insulate members o f 
one strategic group from firms o f another group in the same industry (Porter, 1979). 
Therefore, similar strategic groups may be more and differentiated groups less susceptible 
to convergence. Not only the degree o f coupling, but also the direction and distance 
moved by a firm relevant to that o f its competitors may be important in understanding the 
implications o f strategic change.
Even when firms desire to respond to environmental stimuli by either moving 
toward or distancing themselves from others, the resource based view o f the firm 
acknowledges that resource accumulations and past deployment choices impact firm ability 
to change strategically in pursuit o f a sustainable competitive advantage (Grant, 1991). 
The degree to which the advantage can be sustained is reflective o f how well the resource 
configuration can be imitated (Peterif, 1993). That is, resources have value only when 
employed in particular markets (Mehra, 1996), with capabilities arising from design o f and 
as a by-product o f firm action (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997). Furthermore, a gap may 
exist between the possession and utilization o f certain resources, potentially limiting a 
firm's ability to exploit such resources (Mehra, 1996). Thus, firms considering strategic
85
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
change face not only obstacles to the imitation o f others, but perhaps also limited 
usefulness o f accumulated resources in achieving effective new resource bundles.
Additionally, recent conceptual work proposes mobility barriers operate on both 
the firm and strategic group levels and keep firms from moving both within and across 
strategic groups (Mehra and Floyd, 1998). These mobility barriers are potentially 
asymmetrical within a group in that barriers to the more successful firms may be higher 
than those to less successful firms (Hatten and Hatten, 1987; Mascarenhas and Aaker, 
1989). This intra-group asymmetry leads to significant differences in capabilities among 
intra-group members that may result in intra-group variances in the availability o f key 
strategic options (Lawless, Bergh and Wilsted, 1989) and performance differences among 
strategic group members (Cool and Schendel, 1988).
Inter-group Finn Movement and Strategic Group Change
Limitations to intra-group movement espoused in the resource based view ofthe 
firm and the presence o f mobility barriers suggest that inter-group movement should be 
relatively rare (Lawless and Tegarden, 1991). Yet, some firms do move from group to 
group. In general, inter-group movement is believed to be the result o f both exogenous 
discontinuities and endogenous initiatives (Cool and Schendel, 1987), with the level and 
degree o f change influenced by resource configurations (Grant, 1991) and mobility barriers 
(Lawless and Tegarden, 1991), such as those created by industry factors (Oster, 1982).
Although few changes in group membership are expected during periods o f 
stability and growth, more inter-group movement may be expected during periods where 
exogenous shocks are evident (Mascarenhas, 1989). Likewise, inter-group movement may
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be related to a firm's search for a solution to adverse performance that involves more risk 
taking behavior (March, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 1982), such as changing 
competitive domains. Those adjusting their strategic competitive profile may use other 
strategic groups as benchmarks o f sorts (Kumar, Thomas and Fiegenbaum, 1990), and in 
essence realign their strategy to be more in tune with the referent.
A small but growing literature suggests that past resource allocation decisions may 
be more relevant to mobility barrier creation and ease o f inter-group movement in some 
industries, than others (Oster, 1982). Past research that revealed low levels o f mobility 
(e.g.,Mascarenhas, 1989; Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989) concentrated on the oil industry 
where past decisions often create rigidities. For example, the purchase o f oil patch leasing 
rights is a critical strategic element directly related to productivity, both current and future. 
In industries where past decisions greatly influence mobility, fewer inter-group movements 
are expected.
In contrast, a high degree o f inter-group mobility (e.g., Bogner, Thomas and 
McGee, 1996; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990; and Cool and Schendel, 1987) was 
revealed in studies o f the pharmaceuticals and insurance industries where current sources 
o f action are perhaps not so greatly influenced by rigidities created by past decisions. For 
instance, insurance industry reinsurance activity permits insurers to sell to others risk the 
insurer had initially assumed, freeing firms o f contingent liability associated with past sales 
and allowing new strategic approaches (Huebner, Black and Webb, 1996).
In dose, a review o f the literature suggests that an examination o f strategic group 
dynamics in the insurance industry is likely to reveal substantial realignment. The
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exogenous shocks experienced by the industry should combine with relatively low mobility 
barriers to create a dynamic environment where uncertainty and the search for higher 
performance produced both intra-group and inter-group migration o f firms and perhaps 
a redefinition o f the entire competitive field as entire strategic groups realign their relative 
positions.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The preceding discussion o f strategic group formation and intra and inter-group 
change in strategic competitive position provides a framework from which to explore 
change in the insurance industry. The focus o f this paper is on three major questions: Did 
strategic groups within the property/casualty sector of the insurance industry change 
their strategic competitive profiles relative to themselves or to each other between 1993- 
1996?; Are there patterns o f change within property/casualty strategic group coupling 
over time?; Does the direction, activity level or distance of strategic competitive change 
influence insurer performance?
METHODS 
The Insurance Industry, 1993-1996
Study n  w ill focus on the property/casualty sector o f the insurance industry for the 
years 1993-1996. This time frame was chosen primarily because environmental pressures 
and turbulence, including a high degree o f industry change, may have motivated firms to 
seek alternative market approaches (Gagne, 1996; Mayewsld et al., 1996). Pertinent 
environmental pressures experienced during this period include heightened global 
competition and entry o f new competitors (e.g., banks and securities firms); record
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underwriting losses (e.g., eight o f the top 10 costliest insured catastrophes o f all time 
impacted operations during this period, including Hurricanes Andrew, Opal, In iki and 
Fran, and the Northridge earthquake) and the threat o f large liability losses (e.g., from 
asbestosis, tobacco, the onset o f Y2K), all leading to decreased capacity and increased 
insolvency risk (Insurance Information Institute, 1998).
Also during this time frame, significant incentives to explore the restructuring o f 
traditional distribution systems and other attempts to alter the underlying industry cost 
structure (e.g., adopting a fee-for-service approach versus the traditional commission 
basis) have occurred (Insurance Information Institute, 1998). Market and governmental 
pressures for financial services reform, heightened incentives for integration and 
consolidation o f the securities, banking and insurance functions, and the development o f 
electronic commerce all became competitive realities during the 1993-1996 period. Thus, 
the high degree o f competitive change in this environment likely motivated strategic 
competitive position adjustments within the industry, making it especially well suited to 
the study o f strategic group dynamics.
Sample and Variables
The sample w ill be 95 firms, ranked by 1996 premiums written (see Study I), from 
the property-casuahy sector o f the insurance industry for the years 1993-1996. Selection 
o f strategic variables was based on studies o f the insurance industry (Fiegenbaum, 1987; 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990) and discussions with an expert panel o f industry and 
strategic researchers. Scope o f operation and resource deployment dimensions represent 
firm strategic choices (see Cool and Schendd, 1987, 1988; Fiegenbaum and Thomas,
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1990; Mehra, 1996). Performance was assessed by both economic and operational 
measures. Descriptions o f the variables and logic behind their selection were presented 
in Study I  (pages 29-43), while Tables 1.1 and 1.2 (pages 31-32) illustrated how each o f 
the strategy and performance variables were calculated.
Distance Measures
Two distance measures are useful in the research at hand. First, the change in firm 
distance from its original group mean over the entire period was used to capture firm 
intentions associated with creation o f strategic variety. That is, firms that move away from 
their original strategic group position w ill be involved in decoupling activities, and the 
distance measured w ill reveal the extent o f this decoupling. Here, the importance is on 
distance moved, not just direction or frequency o f movement. Conversely, firms that 
moved closer to the duster center over the course o f the study would be more tightly 
coupled than before, again with distance moved indicative o f the intensity o f this tighter 
coupling, representing less variety. The raw score o f the change in distance w ill be used 
here in that it also hdps capture the direction o f movement, along with the distance.
The second distance measure is somewhat similar in nature to the first, but assesses 
distance from the final strategic group mean location. Again, the logic is that firms at a 
greater distance from this mean experience more variety than those closely assodated with 
the mean. The concept o f both measures is akin to that o f more strategic variety that is 
assodated with strategic distance o f firms in a competitive environment (Dooley, Fowler 
and Miller, 1996) and related higher performance expected o f firms with such strategic
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positions (Jacobsen, 1988). Again, the raw score o f the distance moved w ill be employed 
in order to capture both distance and direction o f movement.
Statistical Analyses
The clustering technique used to identify groups at a particular point in time was 
described in Study I  and is used here to construct groups for each year. These methods 
w ill not be repeated here except as necessary to place the analysis in perspective. An 
important issue in this study w ill be how to best reflect the changes o f interest. To this 
end, two tests are offered to capture strategic group competitive dynamics.
Relative strategic group positions. The first research area o f inquiry in the 
current study revolves around describing strategic group positioning across time. 
Specifically, does the strategic competitive profile o f a strategic group change across time? 
This is measured by a series o f t-tests and F-tests assessing significant differences in the 
aggregate strategic group mean, as well as for each variable, across years. For each 
strategic group in the study, the following null hypothesis is tested:
Ho • |1|| " |1|W “ Hfcl+2 “
against
where g = strategic group number (r.e., 1 ,2 ,..., g), and 
t = benchmark time period (r.e., 0= 1993).
Strategic group coupling. The second research question explores patterns o f
strategic group coupling over time. Coupling refers to the degree o f firm  concentration
around the strategic group mean and can be assessed by noting change in strategic group
variance over time. More specifically, for each group (g), we can test:
%
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where g = strategic group number (i.e., l,2,..,g), and
t -  benchmark time period (i.e., 0= 1993).
Finn strategic competitive profile changes. In the first two tests, the 
characteristics o f the strategic groups at each point in time were examined, ignoring 
changes in group composition. Here the focus is on how individual firms change their 
strategic competitive profile relative to strategic groups as measured by movement in and 
across groups over the 1993-1996 time frame. Performance implications o f change 
patterns w ill also be assessed.
To capture such changes, firms within each group were assigned zones in the 
following manner. Calculations o f the mean distance from the cluster center for all groups 
across the years o f interest were made, as well as standard deviation for each group in 
1993. Then, zone membership was assigned by using the mean for a particular year with 
the standard deviation (s.d.) from 1993 (i.e., the strategic group mean changed yearly, but 
the benchmark s.d. was used systemically). Standard deviations from the base year were 
consistently used in order to create stability in measurement associated with assigning zone 
membership. The goal here was to create a system useful in assigning firms to strategic 
group zones that could be compared from year to year, especially as it relates to firm 
membership and movement in and out o f these zones. In other words, if  variance would 
have been allowed to float from year to year, the definitions o f zones would have changed 
from year to year, thereby obscuring the detection o f coupling and decoupling activity by 
individual firms. To this end, for each group in the years o f interest, firms within one s.d.
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(inclusive) constituted the core, between one and two s.d. (inclusive) the periphery, 
beyond two s.d. the fringe (see Study I  for complete details). Such labeling w ill facilitate 
tracking firm movement in and across groups over time.
Firms were then classified by what direction they moved (i. e., toward or away from 
the core) and the level o f strategic change activity (i.e., how many times they move over 
the four year period o f interest). A matrix was constructed to track the change o f each 
firm. For example the matrix may appear as:
Test 1 Test 2
FIRM 1993 1994 1995 1996 Labd Changes
1 C l C l PI F2 Decoupling 2
2 C l C l C l C l Entrenched 0
3... FI FI PI C l Tighter 2
95 C l PI C l C l Entrenched 2
The sequence C l, C l, PI, F2 would indicate Firm X stayed in the core o f group 1 for the 
first two periods, then moved to the periphery o f the group, and finally to the fringe o f a 
new strategic group. This firm engaged in strategic decoupling and moved two times. 
More generally, firm direction was classified as decoupling, entrenched or tighter coupling.
The level o f activity relative to strategic change is also treated as a grouping 
mechanism. Firms in each o f four categories (i.e., moved 0-3 times) w ill be grouped 
together based on behavior patterns, with an ANOVA utilized to determine whether level 
o f strategic change influenced performance. A composite performance measure was 
inappropriate since each variable contributes unique information to the overall assessment 
o f performance. Hence, five individual performance variables useful in insurance industry 
analysis are employed here, including change in premiums written, change in surplus, loss
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ratio, expense ratio and yield (see Study I  for a discussion of reasoning behind their use 
and calculations).
While the previous tests should provide insight into whether particular types and 
levels o f strategic change influences firm performance, the final firm analysis w ill use 
regression to examine how the change in firm distance from the original strategic group 
mean and its final strategic group location might influence performance. The latter is a 
more fine-grained approach to assessing the influence o f strategic competitive profile 
change on performance than the former. The raw scores o f how far each firm has moved 
from its original position and distance from its final group mean (correlation=.19) w ill be 
used to determine performance influences (measured at Pa). Each aspect o f performance 
w ill be the dependent variable in separate tests o f the following equation:
Y=b0 + b,Xl + b2X2
where: Ya = Performance,
= (X,+j "Mgit+j), - (X ,.p„t),
“  (X,+J - Pfft+j),
t = time (0 = 1993), and 
g, = original group 
g2 = destination group.
The previously described tests may provide insight into both intra and inter-group 
competitive behavior previously excluded from analysis. Specifically, these analyses 
should provide a view into strategic group positioning across time and relative to each 
other, changes in the degree o f strategic group coupling over time, and finally how 
individual firms move in and across groups and the accompanying performance 
implications.
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RESULTS
Clustering Procedures
Pearson zero-ordered correlations among scope o f operation, resource deployment 
and performance variables for the years 1993-1995 are presented in Tables 2.1-2.3. Table 
1.1 (p.31) in Study I  provides such information for 1996. Using these scope and resource 
deployment variables, cluster analysis was first performed on the sample for the years 
1993-1996 following the same procedures outline in Study I. Agglomeration schedules 
used in the process are found in Table 2.4. Using the same heuristics to determine the 
number o f groups used in Study I, three groups emerged for each o f the years o f interest 
and ANOVA showed significant differences existed across the eleven variables (F=19.056, 
/K.001) - see Table 2.5. Therefore, researcher judgement is that three groups exist in each 
year o f the data.
Examination o f the strategic competitive profile o f each group revealed that, while 
there was some variance, the three groups followed closely with the names and profiles 
used in Study I. The first group consists largely o f stock companies o f average age who 
sell primarily commercial coverage to small-to-moderate businesses. The second group 
contains mostly mutual insurers who are generally the youngest in the sample, have the 
lowest line diversity and usually distribute their product via exclusive agency. The third 
group contains mostly older, big stock companies that write business primarily to large 
commercial firms through an agency system. Hence, for the rest o f the analysis, names 
that reflect the primary characteristics o f the group w ill be used (see Study I, pp. 51-52
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14. hvestment Yield 
hifNnaacoOpcntisaal
13. Change in Premiums
 Id ClMMcmSumlui__
-.23 .09 .24 .42 .03 .44 .33
-.20 .07 -.26 -.67 .02 -.19 .08 .01
.40 .23 -.15 -.16 -.16 -.09 -.21 -.09 .09
-.20 -.15 .23 .16 .27 .04 .31 .20 .05 -.22
.09 -.01 -.12 -.10 .11 -.11 -.03 -.19 .23 .58 -.04
-.32 .26 .40 .52 .05 .24 .23 .44 -.27 -.13 .09 -.31
-.12 .10 .11 .14 .08 .14 I o .21 .16 .16 -.18 .13 .16
-.12 -.08 .03 -.07 -.23 .19 -.28 -.11 -.27 -.22
.1 3  -.33 .01 -.12 -OS .09 -.03 -08  .23 -44
-.13 -.20 .04 -.13
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Table 2.3 
C orrelations, 1993
A 2 _fi L 9 10 11 12 13 U ___ \S_
1. Personal Lines
2. Property Products .37
3. Financial Products -.56 -.12
4. Line Diversity -.33 .12 .32
5. Size -.18 -.18 .10 .18
6. Ownership Form -.37 -.04 .30 .40 -.03
7. Age -.20 -.16 .16 .36 .44 .05
L Resource Deployawats
8, Agency -.22 .05 .24 .44 .04 .44 .33
9. Reinsurance .19 .02 -.24 -.11 .02 -.16 .07 .02
10. Leverage .42 .05 -.22 -.15 -.06 -.10 -.12 -.01 .22
11, Investment Mix -.14 -.14 .22 .18 .28 -.00 .36 .29 -.01 -.12
Perfsraraace-Ecoeoeiic
12. Loss Ratio -.23 -.24 .02 -.07 .33 -.13 .13 -.08 .17 .01 .01
13. Expense Ratio -.25 .26 .40 .46 -.16 .35 .16 .46 -.31 -.14 .08
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for a more complete description). Group one w ill be labeled Main Streeters, group two 
Partisans, and group three White Collars, respectively.
Statistical Analyses
Relative strategic group positions. The means on each variable for each year, 
as well as overall ANOVAs, are presented for each strategic group in Tables 2.6-2.8. F- 
tests reveal that the Partisans group did not significantly change its strategic competitive 
profile (F>.332, p<802) over the four years o f the study (Table 2.7), but that the Main 
Streeters group (F>2.573, p<059) and the White Collars (F>7.432, p<000) did 
experience significant strategic competitive position change at an alpha o f. 10 (see Tables 
2.6 and 2.8, respectively).
Posthoc analysis also revealed the Main Streeters and White Collar groups appear 
to converge on many o f the variables o f interest, particularly between 1994 and 199S. 
Table 2.9 shows the value o f each variable for the White Collars and Main Streeters, as 
well as the difference between the two, across the years o f the study (1993-1996). In 
general, the Main Streeters increased their level o f personal lines activity (PPERS) while 
the White Collars reduced theirs, with the two groups becoming nearly alike. Both groups 
increased property (PPROP) sales activity, but the Main Streeters did so more rapidly, 
thus the two again became more alike. The Main Streeters group became somewhat more 
diversified (DIVER) and more like the White Collars. They also became more highly 
leveraged (LEVER), while the White Collars lowered their leverage, thus again becoming 
more alike. Over the course o f the study, the Main Streeters raised their level o f 
reinsurance activity (REIN), while the White Collars lowered theirs.
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Convergence of Main Streeter (MS) and White Collar (WC) Gronpa
MS WC MS-WC MS WC MS-WC
PKRS REIN
1993 .1344 .3949 •2605 1993 -.8450 -.1809 -.6641
1994 .0175 .3643 •2768 1994 -.6455 -2334 -.4121
1995 .2411 .2855 -.0444 1995 -.5220 -.1442 -.3778
1996 .2630 .3013 -.0383 1996 -.4037 -.3502 -.0535
FPROP LEVER
1993 .2988 .4372 -.1384 1993 .9552 1.3060 -.3508
1994 .2351 .4283 -.1932 1994 .9704 1.3885 -.4181
1995 .4768 .5562 -.0794 1995 1.1249 1.0260 .0989
1996 .4811 .5230 -.0419 1996 1.0394 1.0972 -.0578
PFNAN INVEST
1993 .0395 .0197 .0198 1993 1.5695 1.7811 -.2166
1994 .0348 .0229 .0119 1994 1.7995 1.8125 -.0130
1995 .0249 .0206 .0043 1995 1.4696 2.0077 -.5381
1996 .0220 .0219 .0001 1996 1.7122 1.8831 -.1709
DIVER OWNER
1993 .7010 .8137 -.1127 1993 .92 .91 .01
1994 .6468 .8355 -.1887 1994 .80 .94 .06
1995 .7795 .8321 -.0526 1995 .90 .93 .03
1996 .7865 .8561 -.0696 1996 .90 .87 .03
SIZE AGENCY
1993 14.62 14.95 -.33 1993 .0769 .9300 -.8531
1994 14.92 15.06 -.14 1994 .0670 1.000 -.9333
1995 14.66 15.31 . -.65 1995 .3800 .9700 -.5900
1996 14.85 1527 -.42 1996 .3500 1.000 -.6500
AGE
1993 35.15 82.49 -47.34
1994 45.40 90.00 -44.60
1995 41.66 1032 -61.54
1996 40.97 106.9 -65.93
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The average White Collar firm  age became much older because younger firms fit 
the profile o f those that moved from the White Collars to the Main Streeters. These firms 
also primarily sold personal and property lines and were more highly leveraged. Thus, 
over the course o f the study the strategic competitive profile o f the Main Streeters and the 
White Collar groups became more alike. Figure 2.1 shows graphically the convergence 
o f the two groups on several variables o f interest. Similar post hoc analysis showed no 
substantial changes in other inter-group relationships, such as between White Collars or 
Main Streeters and Partisans, except to note that convergence o f the former two caused 
somewhat o f a readjustment in their relationship with the latter. That is, the White Collars 
and Main Streeters were already strategically positioned away from the Partisans. This did 
not change substantially, but the convergence action of the former two did cause their 
relative relationship to the Partisans to be adjusted over the 1993-1996 period. Overall, 
the White Collars and Main Streeters were positioned slightly closer to the Partisans at the 
end o f the study than at the beginning.
Strategic group coupling. Table 2.10 presents Levene statistics, a common test 
for homogeneity o f variance (Hair et a/., 1995: 285), for each group across the years 
1993-1996. Results showed that equal variance could not be assumed for the Main 
Streeters (Levene=7.065, #3,84, p<000) and White Collars (Levene=3.173, #3,135, 
p<026), while analysis o f the Partisans showed no difference in variance (Levene=.128, 
#3,149, p<.943) across the four years o f study. Thus, the Partisans show stability in both 
position and degree o f strategic group coupling over the period o f interest, while the Main 
Streeters and White Collars exhibit change on both dimensions. Interestingly, for both the
106
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YEAR: 1993 YEAR: 1994
Jl I r
AGENCY INVEST OVERALL PFNAN PPROP
O VBt LEVER OWNER PPERS REIN
VARIABLE
1 r
AGENCY INVEST OVERALL PFNAN PPROP
DIVER LEVER OWNER PPERS RON
VARIABLE
YEAR: 1996 YEAR: 1996
II L i ■ir
WC 10
AGENCY INVEST OVERALL PFNAN PPROP
DIVER LEVER OVWER PPERS RBN
VARIABLE
AGENCY INVEST OVERALL PFNAN PPROP
DIVER LEVER OWNER PPStS RBN
VARIABLE
Figure 2.1
Convergence o f Main Streeters and W hite Collars
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Main Streeters .62356 1.51305 .31494 .29525 7.065 3,84 .000
Partisans 1.32335 1.11872 1.42928 1.38825 .128 3,149 .943
White Collars .64714 .67677 1.89752 .25517 3.173 3,135 .026
White Collars and Main Streeters the variance measures were much smaller in 1996 than 
in 1993, suggesting a tighter coupling o f firms in these groups.
Firm strategic competitive profile changes. Next, the issues o f strategic 
competitive profile change on the firm level, as measured by movement in and across the 
three identified strategic groups for the 1993-1996 period, was examined, along with any 
resultant influence on performance. Strategic group zones (i.e., core, periphery and 
fringe) were assigned using the previously described measures o f distance from group 
means and standard deviation. Results o f the group and zone assignments in each year are 
summarized in Table 2.11. Note that the three strategic groups became more evenly 
balanced in membership over the four years. O f the firms that changed strategic groups, 
most firms realigned from the Partisans and White Collars groups to the Main Streeters 
group. In the Main Streeters group, all firms resided in either the core or periphery zones 
in both 1995 and 1996. The White Collars group also became more tightly coupled over 
the period o f study, with no firms in the fringe zone in 1996.
108
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Table 2.11
Strategic Group and Zone Membership
Year______ Croop_____ Pregnancy Core Periphery Fringe
1993 Main Streeters 13 10 2 1
Partisans 39 33 4 2
White Collars 43 32 8 3
1994 Main Streeters 15 6 5 4
Partisans 44 36 7 1
White Collars 36 28 5 3
1995 Main Streeters 29 23 6 0
Partisans 36 29 5 2
White Collars 30 16 11 3
1996 Main Streeters 31 26 5 0
Partisans 34 27 5 2
White Collars 30 27 3 0
As for individual firms, sixty-one (65%) did not move even one zone in the period, 
twenty four decoupled, while only ten moved closer to their core. Results shown in Table 
2.12 suggest that the direction o f movement had no significant relationship with firm 
performance (Wilk*s Lambda=.869, #10,176, F=1.28, p<245).
However, the level o f activity, as measured by the number o f strategic group zone 
changes (i.e., zero changes, N=40; one change, N=22; two changes, N=27; three changes, 
N=6), was significantly related to firm  performance (Wilk*sLambda=.761, #15,240,
109
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Table 2.12
Strategic Competitive Profile Changes
Wilk's
L—Mi i i __________F Sifjfkaacc
Type of Activity .169 10,176 1.280 .245
Level of Activity .761 15,240 1.668 .058
Teats of Betweea Subject Effects - Level of Activity
Perform aace Variable
Type m Sum 
of Squares df F Sifaiflcaace
YIELD S. 192 3 1.944 .128
LOSS RATIO 11.233 3 4.117 .009
CHANGE IN PREMIUM 3.572 3 1.151 .333
CHANGE IN SURPLUS 2.783 3 .915 .437
EXPENSE RATIO 1.936 3 .914 .438
Bouferroui P o* hoc ou Loss Ratio













F=1.668, p<058). Tests o f between subject effects revealed the significant performance 
differences statistic was being driven by the Loss Ratio variable (F>4.117, p< 009). A 
closer look at Bonferroni post hoc comparisons revealed that firms who changed strategic
group zone location three times over the period o f the study (the most possible) had 
significantly higher loss ratios than those who did not change zones (p< 018), as well as
110
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those that changed zones once (p< 006) or twice (p<010). Thus, the type o f change 
activity did not have an effect on performance, but the level o f activity did, at least for the 
Loss Ratio variable - one o f the most important measures o f performance in the insurance 
industry.
Table 2.13 reports the regression results o f the final research question which 
explored how the overall change in firm strategic competitive position relative to its 
original group mean and final location within a strategic group might influence various 
elements o f performance. None o f the models were significant. Thus, the results show 
that the differences in distance from the original group mean over the period or from the 
final group mean does not influence the aspects o f performance under review here.
Table 2.13









Expense Ratio Lore Ratio Yield
Intercept -.012 .022 -.062 -.027 .054
(106) (105) (0*7) (103) (101)
Change in -.149 .039 -.195 -.254 .100
Distance (1*8) (.1*5) (154) (1*2) (-17*)
Distance
from final .185 .202 -.087 .200 .035
group core (130) (12*) (107) (126) (123)
non
Adjusted R* .005 .007 .005 .022 .017
Standard errors arc in paienthcKs,aF93
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Summarily, research inquiry three was: Does the direction, activity level, or 
distance o f strategic competitive change influence performance? Results show the 
direction, or type, o f activity, and competitive position distances did not, while the level 
o f change activity did influence certain aspects o f performance.
DISCUSSION 
Relative Strategic Group Positions
Patterns o f strategic group competitive profile change revealed two strategic group 
competitive profiles (i.e., Main Streeters and White Collars) changed across time, while 
that o f the Partisans did not. A closer look at the nature o f the ownership form o f firms 
in each strategic group might help explain this finding.
The Partisans group got its name primarily from the almost single-minded approach 
to championing the cause o f their clients (i.e., providing coverage to their policyholders). 
The ownership o f Partisan firms is largely mutual, which combines the owner and 
policyholder roles. Although there is room for potential conflict because o f differences 
inherent in policyholder and stockholder goals, mutuals tend to overcome this by having 
a cost-centered orientation. By definition mutual firms provide the type o f insurance 
coverage their owners desire, not necessarily what general markets demand, so they may 
be somewhat more insulated from environmental pressures to change their strategic 
approach. The Partisans appear fundamentally different in their strategic orientation than 
the other two groups, a difference that does not change substantially over the course o f 
the study.
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Conversely, Main Streeter and White Collar members are primarily stock owned 
and profit centered and therefore perhaps more susceptible to exogenous influences than 
their Partisan peers. As previously discussed, firms that changed strategic groups tended 
to move from the White Collar group to the Main Streeters, and the firms remaining in the 
White Collar group appeared to more or less mimic the Main Streeters on many variables 
o f interest. This convergence o f competitive profiles indicates that member firms have 
increasingly similar views on competitive behavior. That is, there appears to be a decrease 
in the number o f strategic approaches deemed acceptable or profitable in this particular 
competitive environment, as witnessed by the movement o f firms in these two groups 
toward a new equilibrium o f sorts.
For example, while the Main Streeters increased their proportion o f personal sales, 
leverage and reinsurance activity, the White Collars decreased theirs. Strategic change in 
each group propelled the two toward a similar level on these variables. The last few years 
o f general increases in premiums written for average White Collar firms may have 
generated sufficient returns to the point that leverage could be reduced. Similarly, there 
may be less need to sell o ff previously written business to the reinsurance market, again 
because coffers appeared fuller than in the past. The choice o f remaining White Collars 
to become more conservative on leverage and reinsurance activities, along with their 
substantial increase in premiums written, paid o ff in the form o f an increase in yield, the 
insurance industry equivalent o f return on investment.
The White Collars and Main Streeters may have also felt the same environmental 
pressures to offer expansive services (i.e., broad product lines) to potential customers that
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
has characterized other financial services providers, such as banks. While the White 
Collars and Main Streeters did not entirely move into markets previously dominated by 
each other, they did become more similar in products offered and customer base. This 
pattern may well continue as legal definitions and statutes that have traditionally helped 
clearly demarcate industry boundaries for financial service providers continue to fall. For 
instance, a recent United States Supreme Court decision now permits banks to sell 
insurance policies other than credit life [Nationsbank v. VAUC, S13 US 251 (1995,)]. 
Such action may well be a harbinger o f continued blurring o f boundaries, as financial 
services providers are allowed to sell each others products {e.g., stock brokers selling 
insurance, insurance companies selling certificates o f deposit). Thus, the convergence o f 
these two strategic groups may be related to changing views o f competitive action believed 
necessary to remain profitable in a newly defined or evolving environment, and thereby 
able to keep stockholders placated.
Strategic Group Coupling
Assessing changes in strategic group variances across time provided an insightful 
look at group stability. The three strategic groups all had somewhat different levels o f 
strategic group coupling over tune. While the Main Streeters experienced a wide swing 
in variance from 1993 to 1994, indicating a decoupling o f firms within the group, years 
1995 and 1996 showed overall much lower variances for the group. This pattern seems 
to indicate that in 1994, the Main Streeters may have been responding to major, perhaps 
fundamental, changes in their competitive environment. Since insurers were likely affected 
during this period by costly natural catastrophes, there may have been a great need for this
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group (which caters to hard-hit individuals and the small business community) to change 
their competitive approach in response. Since less variance was observed over the course 
o f the study, the Main Streeter member firms somewhat converged, with less competitive 
variety apparent toward the end o f the study period.
The White Collars group may have also responded to fundamental changes in the 
competitive environment, but not until 1995. The strategic competitive profile o f this 
group is old and large which might account for the apparent slowness o f response (Hitt, 
Ireland and Hoskisson, 1999). 1995 also marks the year in which group membership fell 
from 36 to 30, with most moving to the Main Streeters group, and those remaining more 
tightly coupled. Although these two groups experienced a tighter coupling over time, 
most firms that changed their competitive profile over the course o f the study were 
classified as engaged in decoupling activity. Together these findings seem to indicate that 
those firms who changed strategically moved to a new strategic group and closely 
followed the strategic patterns o f others in the new group. This is consistent with 
reference point theory which suggests strategic groups often act as reference points to 
those seeking guidance on appropriate strategies (Fiegenbaum, Hart and Schendel, 1996).
Perhaps firms in the White Collars group saw three options. Option one, stay in 
the group and not change strategic competitive profile. This may have been by choice or 
lack o f mobility. Two, respond to environmental pressures by imitating the strategic 
competitive profile o f the Main Streeters group. The Main Streeters appear to write more 
commercial policies for small to moderate business, a group that was especially hard hit 
with 1994 uninsured losses. For instance, the Northridge earthquake alone caused twenty
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billion dollars in property damage, o f which 7.5 billion was uninsured (Insurance 
Information Institute, 1998). In general, the industry wrote proportionately more 
commercial policies during 1994-1995 period, perhaps partially in response to smaller 
firms seeking to protect themselves from similar uninsured losses. Hence, some White 
Collars firms may have changed to the Main Streeters strategic competitive profile in order 
to more easily tap other markets, while continuing to serve the large corporate market.
Option three, respond to environmental pressures and opportunities by staying in 
the White Collars group and increasing focus on the big-business commercial aspect o f 
sales. The White Collars focus on liability, financial and commercial lines, and their clients 
are typically larger businesses. Variance patterns o f remaining firms revealed less variety 
in competitive approaches. A closer look at the group strategic competitive profile shows 
a higher level o f commercial activity. This may be in response to a growing economy, 
which resulted in much commercial expansion, and in turn more insurance needs.
The Partisans group appears to have been substantially insulated from 
environmental pressures in that both the strategic profile and group variances did not 
significantly change over the course o f the study. One phenomenon that may influence the 
stability o f the Partisan group is the demutualization issue. Some mutually owned firms 
have recently announced their intention to change from mutual to stock form, primarily in 
order to have greater access to capital markets (see Birkmaier and Laster, 1999).
In sum, it appears that White Collar firms followed one o f the three described 
options, as witnessed by the variance patterns presented in Table 2.9, group membership 
in Table 2.4, zone membership in Table 2.11 and additional post hoc analysis. For such
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a substantial migration to have occurred from White Collars and Partisans to Main 
Streeters, firms in the former two groups had to have experienced low, or at least 
acceptable, barriers to exit from their old group and entry to the new group. This may be 
especially true for White Collars who may have more options to change to Main Streeters 
than vice-versa. Specifically, it is likely easier to move from writing large company to 
writing smaller company commercial coverage than is the opposite. Conversely, those 
firms that remained may have mobility barriers, such as rigidities associated with past 
strategic decisions or lack o f appropriate resources, that kept them from changing 
competitively. Among White Collars in this study, younger firms tended to move and 
older firms tended to stay, perhaps indicating the former had more choice to leave.
Or, perhaps the remaining firms represent a profitable niche o f sorts, and the 
previously discussed environmental pressures had more or less dislodged other firms, 
encouraging them to change strategically. Firms may have perceived a need to become 
more oriented to selling large commercial policies in order to remain competitive in the 
White Collar group. This likely would have necessitated reducing their level o f emphasis 
on small business or personal business. This scenario is supported by the fact that younger 
firms primarily selling personal and property coverage fit the general profile o f firms 
moving from the White Collars to the Main Streeters. A tighter coupling o f firms 
remaining in the White Collars group indicates a decline in the variety o f strategic 
competitive approaches within the group, consistent with DiMaggio and Powell (1983). 
Overall, there appears to be tighter strategic group coupling and less competitive variety, 
thus signaling an isomorphic occurrence.
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Firm Level Changes
Results o f analysis o f firm strategic competitive change influence on performance 
indicated type o f change as categorized by decoupling, entrenched or tighter coupling 
activities did not influence firm performance. These findings contradict expectations from 
both the resource based and institutional camps. From the resource based view o f the firm 
perspective, firms engaged in decoupling activities might have been expected to have a 
higher level o f performance. These firms should possess more resources that are rare, 
valuable, costly to imitate, and with few substitutes, the hallmarks o f sustainable 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) and a precursor to persistent abnormal returns 
(Jacobsen, 1988). From the institutional perspective firms moving closer to the core may 
have been expected to have higher performance. Firms that conform to strategies used by 
other firms are viewed as more legitimate than firms who behave strategically different 
from the accepted norm (Deephouse, 1996). Neither perspective proves useful in 
explaining the findings. These two theories respectively propose that searches for 
uniqueness and legitimacy leads to strategic changes. However, perhaps poor performance 
is the primary motivator in a search for some new competitive position.
Sixty-five percent o f firms did not change strategic competitive position over the 
course o f the study. This is consistent with, but somewhat lower than, previous findings 
that nearly ninety percent o f firms experienced no strategic intra-group change 
(Mascarenhas, 1989; Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989). The current study measured inter­
group change, which likely accounts for the higher level o f change detected. However, 
only eighteen firms changed groups over the course o f the study (i.e., approximately 81%
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
did not), which is consistent with previous studies. Regardless o f the type o f change 
activity, there appears to be no performance implications associated with either the 
direction o f strategic change, or lack thereof.
Firms that changed their strategic competitive profile relative to their group three 
times over the period suffered a significantly higher loss ratio than those who changed 
profiles once, twice or not at all. This may be reflective o f the notion that strategic plans 
are long range in nature, and firms must be willing to make a commitment to such plans, 
or suffer performance consequences. Together the results o f influence on performance o f 
type and level o f activity indicate that the type o f activity (decoupled, tighter coupling, 
entrenched) had no significant influence on performance, but firms that changed strategic 
competitive profile often suffered relative to the loss ratio.
Finally, results show no facets o f performance were influenced by a firm’s change 
(over the course ofthe study) in distance from the original group mean or in distance from 
the final group mean, implying that neither decoupling or coupling activity influenced firm 
performance. Therefore, firms should not feel pressured to stay close to their strategic 
group core (whose identity most closely represents that o f the strategic group) such as 
might be implied by institutional theory. It seems using core firms as reference points in 
the strategic change process provides no tangible performance impact. Similarly, both the 
resource based view o f the firm  and niche theory would suggest firms might have higher 
performance if  they moved away from this core. Again, there appears to be no evidence 
to support the contention that performance would be enhanced by such a move. Overall, 
neither coupling or decoupling activity influenced performance.
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CONCLUSION
This research has shown that for the insurance industry between 1993-1996: (1) 
Some, but not all, groups changed their strategic competitive profile, suggesting that 
environmental pressures (i.e., incremental and fundamental) influenced groups in different 
ways; (2) Tighter coupling and less competitive variety indicates that groups are becoming 
more like each other • isomorphism appears to be at work; (3) Firms that substantially 
changed their strategic competitive position repeatedly over the course ofthe study had 
lower performance, indicating the need to "pick a strategy and stick to it” ; (4) The expense 
ratio facet o f performance was lowered by moving away from the original core strategic 
competitive profile - some level o f uniqueness is rewarded.
Collectively, the results indicate that study o f strategic group change can provide 
much information useful to practitioners and researchers alike. For instance, some 
strategic groups change over time, while others remain stable, showing there are 
differences in perceptions o f strategic behavior necessary to successfully compete in a 
particular environment. At least two strategic groups were shown to have converged on 
many competitive aspects and moved toward some new equilibrium. I f  the trend 
continues, this reduction in the number o f successful strategic competitive approaches 
available to firms competing in the property/casualty market could signal a somewhat 
generic approach to the market by many participants. Only a more long term study could 
reveal if  in fact the convergence o f the Main Streeters and White Collars continues.
Different groups were influenced by and responded to the environment in different 
ways. The third group (Partisans) showed little  to no change relative to their original
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competitive position and to the other two groups over the course o f the study. O f 
additional interest in a more long-term study would be whether the Partisans maintain their 
stability. Perhaps their status as mainly mutuals shields them from some general 
environmental pressures. Thus, the Partisans may be able to change very little  over the 
years, maintaining a stable strategic competitive profile. Again, only a longer term study 
w ill reveal whether Partisan stability continues, especially in light ofthe demutualization 
issue.
Several limitations to the current research should be noted. First, a sample size o f 
95 permitted detection o f all medium and large effects, with a larger N necessary to detect 
all effects. Some changes are likely to be small in nature, hence the current research may 
not detect all important changes. Secondly, it is reasonable to question whether these 
findings are truly representative o f performance differences associated with strategic 
competitive profile change or whether they may be an artifact o f the relatively large 
number o f tests performed. That is, since difference in only one performance variable on 
a single test was identified and the effects were modest, perhaps the results were 
happenstance and not truly representative o f the strategic change-performance 
relationship. Finally, the focus o f this study was obviously on. one sector 
(property/casualty) o f a single industry (insurance). Thus these specific findings are not 
generalizable beyond the sample at hand. However, as a result o f this study overall 
knowledge o f strategic groups dynamics is enhanced, especially relative to change 
measurements.
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In general, measurement o f intra-group differences is markedly absent from 
published research despite theoretical acknowledgment o f the importance o f such intra­
group differences {e.g., Reger and Huff, 1993;Ketchene/o/., 1993). The current research 
used three specific tests to determine the potential ramifications o f changes in firm 
strategic competitive profile by assessing changes in intra-group zones. Type and level o f 
change activity, as well as distance moved and final location were examined to determine 
performance influences; all o f which are much more explicit tests than previously found 
in the strategic change literature. Observing patterns o f strategic competitive change 
among and across strategic groups and their zones has provided a rich look at such 
phenomena as differences in level o f environmental influence, isomorphic activity, the need 
for stability in strategic planning processes and performance benefits o f being somewhat 
different from the masses in competitive approach.
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STUDY m
REPUTATION CHANGE AS CATALYST IN 
STRATEGIC COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS: A STRATEGIC GROUPS VIEW 
FROM THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY, 1993-1996
Strategic competitive position reflects firm approaches to the market, including 
scope of operations and resource deployment activity (Cool and Schendd, 1987, 1988; 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996). Firms may face competitive pressures to 
maintain some commonality in strategic position from firm to firm, but also to maintain 
unique features (Deephouse, 1999), which may serve as a source o f competitive 
advantage. Change in firm  strategic competitive position does not usually involve all 
competitive dimensions (Mascarenhas, 1989), although firms are potentially motivated to 
change their strategic competitive position for many reasons. One such reason may be the 
pursuit o f a better reputation, particularly for firms in industries where consumer 
confidence is o f utmost importance.
Reputation labels firms in a way that identifies those held in high regard (Shrum 
and Wuthnow, 1988). Financial performance, social responsibility and product quality are 
all dimensions o f reputation that could be considered. In the current study, the focus w ill 
be on firm reputation for financial stability, which reflects both past performance as well 
as current and anticipated strategic decisions. This component o f reputation is extremely 
important in most any business, but particularly those in the insurance industry due to the 
intangible, contingent, long-term nature o f the products offered. One common way to 
gauge insurer reputation is to look to rating agencies who collect and disseminate such 
information. The assessment o f reputation often includes dependence on these ratings 
intermediaries (Fombrun, 1996).
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The current paper w ill use such ratings to examine the relationship between 
reputation and strategic competitive position, how reputation change might serve as a 
catalyst to strategic competitive change, and any performance implications o f such change. 
Ninety-five firms in the property/casualty sector o f the insurance industry for the years 
1993-1996 are used to explore the reputation-strategic competitive position relationship. 
Hypotheses and methods o f statistical analysis are offered, followed by results, discussion 
and conclusions ofthe findings.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Reputation and Ratings
Reputation has been defined as the knowledge about a firm and the emotions 
towards it held by the firm's stakeholders (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; Hall, 1992; 
Fombrun, 1996), and can be viewed as the outcome ofthe process o f legitimation (Rao, 
1994). At the firm level, reputation may be a resource leading to superior performance 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991) and a catalyst to increased chances o f firm 
survival (Rao, 1994). In general, reputation models assume a close relationship between 
past actions and future expectations, as well as organizational attributes and evaluations 
ofthe organization (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988).
Reputation for financial stability is important in the insurance industry as a measure 
o f future claims paying ability o f an insurer. Forinstance, due to the future oriented nature 
ofproducts offered by insurers, consumers justifiably seek evidence oflong-term financial 
stability and solvency ofthe firms with which they may be inclined to do business. While 
indications o f future claims paying ability is critical, reputation is also important in
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obtaining continued investor support and confidence and can be a resource leading to 
superior performance (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991). In fact, reputation may 
be the single most valuable intangible resource that a company may employ in developing 
and exploiting their competitive advantage (Hall, 1992). Most potential customers or 
investors are neither willing nor able to accurately assess insurer financial condition, or 
other pertinent quality factors related to reputation, due to the relative complexity ofthe 
task (Meier, 1988). Thus, many rely on entities such as ratings agencies that have 
comparative advantage in the collection, analysis and dissemination o f such information 
(Wakeman, 1981).
Insurer ratings are widely publicized measures o f insurer reputation that are readily 
available to the insuring public. Rating agencies, such as the A.M. Best Company, 
Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's Investor Services and Weiss Ratings, Inc., long have 
been recognized as providing valuable information to actual and potential policyholders 
regarding the default or claims-paying risk o f one insurer relative to another. These 
insurer rating agencies generate revenues from the end users (e.g., the public, agents, 
brokers) o f their rating opinions and often from fee revenues paid by insurers wishing to 
submit themselves to detailed, objective financial examination by the agency (Klein, 1992).
Insurers are willing to regularly engage in such costly, time-consuming examination 
processes by many different rating agencies at once. Reasons include high consumer 
interest in the rating opinions o f the agencies and the resulting potential for substantial 
marketing, promotion and related placement value that accrue to those insurers that 
consistently earn comparatively higher ratings. Insurers often have whole departments or
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staffing components whose sole function is to interact with various rating agencies, who 
are acknowledged as powerful brokers in the realm o f information distribution concerning 
financial security. In fact, ratings are perceived to be so important as to serve as a catalyst 
in strategic management planning and implementation processes o f the insurer, with 
strategic plans reflecting the potential impact o f various strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and risks on reputational ratings (Fillingham, 1993).
Rating agendas, for obvious business reasons, try to minimize the potential for 
issuing ratings that do not accurately reflect the relative riskiness o f a given insurer. 
Rating agendes go to great lengths to not dichotomize their ratings as dther good or bad, 
but merely give their opinion as to the financial status o f an insurer. However, marketsdo 
recognize and respond to differences in the secure and vulnerable ranges o f ratings, with 
higher rated firms having greater market potential than their lower rated competitors 
(Ferguson, Barrese and Levy, 1998). The secure range generally indicates a firm's 
financial state is such that the firm is expected to honor all legitimate claims, while the 
vulnerable range tends to indicate potential limitations to such ability, particularly when 
adverse economic conditions prevail.
Many positive consequences may result from an insurer maintaining a good 
reputation as reflected in higher ratings such as an increased applicant base containing 
proportionately better {i.e., profitable) risks and higher potential premium receipts. The 
latter lowers liquidity risk and affords the insurer an opportunity to strengthen and better 
diversify their investment portfolio.
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Conversely, negative consequences typically accrue to firms earning lower ratings 
indicative o f greater potential financial vulnerability to economic conditions. For example, 
an insurer with a low rating may be excluded from being able to compete for certain 
customers or classes o f business (Ferguson, Barrese and Levy, 1998). Many corporate 
risk managers have institutional policies that preclude placing business with a potentially 
vulnerable insurer without stringent justification. Additionally, professional agents have 
a significant incentive to avoid higher risk insurers since agents may be held financially 
liable to their customers (by statute) for placing business with a financially unstable insurer 
that fails (Hardigree and Howe, 1990). Further, a large body o f literature exists that 
explores adverse financial effects (e.g., in a firm's bond or stock price) that may result from 
downgrades in rating [see Felton, Hearth and Liu (1995) and Hand, Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1992) for reviews]. Overall, these factors indicate an intertwining o f reputation 
and how insurers might choose to conduct business as evidenced by their strategic 
competitive position.
Reputation and Strategic Competitive Position
Insurers thus have strong incentives to achieve the highest target rating consistent 
with their strategic plan, which incorporates important dimensions such as applicable 
underwriting standards, investment philosophy, liquidity position and capitalization level, 
among others (Ferguson, Barrese and Levy, 1998). For example, stringent underwriting 
standards may result in better underwriting results (i.e., lower loss ratio), but perhaps also 
lead to lower sales and cash flow. In such a case, insurers may be inclined to follow more 
aggressive investment strategies since investment earnings supplement underwriting
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profits. These strategic underwriting choices are representative ofthe myriad o f other 
strategic choices made by insurers, all with potential influences on reputation.
In order to explore the relationship between strategic group competitive position 
and reputation, two related findings are employed. Fust, Study I utilized a multifaceted 
assessment o f both operational and economic intra-group performance. Results showed 
strategic group zones farthest from the group mean strategic competitive profile (i.e., 
fringe) experienced better performance, followed by periphery and then core zones (see 
Study I for details). Furthermore, firm reputation has been positively linked to several 
aspects o f firm performance, including profitability (Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Fombrun 
and Shanley, 1993), financial soundness, long-term investment value and appropriate use 
o f corporate assets (Fryxell and Wang, 1994), attractiveness to lenders and investors 
(McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis, 1988) and ultimate firm survival (Rao, 1994). 
Taken together, strategic group zones are expected to have different reputations, with the 
fringe zones perhaps having the highest.
Similar logic can also be found in niche theory that proposes that firms who occupy 
unprecedented strategic competitive positions have a better opportunity to produce above 
average returns (Bharadwaj, Varadarajan and Fahy, 1993). Maintenance o f firm 
sustainable competitive advantage depends upon the degree o f value, rarity, mutability and 
substitutability o f a firm's primary competence (Barney, 1991). Thus, firm affiliation with 
a strategic group fringe may reflect organizations most likely to obtain a sustainable 
competitive advantage, with such an outlying position beneficial to performance 
(Bharadwaj, Varadarajan and Fahy, 1993). Again, given the reputation-performance link,
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strategic group zones are expected to have different reputations, with fringe zones having 
the highest, followed by periphery then core zones. The following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 1: Strategic group zones w ill collectively have different reputations.
While hypothesis one looks at the reputation-strategic competitive position
relationship from the strategic group zone perspective, another way to analyze this
relationship is on the firm level. Markets become less contestable as strategic distances
increase, with firms or groups more successful in niche development when distances are
great (Hatten and Hatten, 1987). Firms that are able to detach themselves from the masses
should be able to maintain a higher reputation. That is, firms at a greater strategic distance
should possess more resources that are rare, valuable, costly to imitate, and with few
substitutes, the hallmarks o f sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) and a
precursor to persistent positive abnormal returns (Jacobsen, 1988). Given that a
complementary relationship between reputation and performance is expected (e.g.,
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis, 1988; Sobol and Farrelly, 1988; Fombrun and
Shanley, 1993; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Rao, 1994), firms farthest from the mean strategic
group competitive profile should have the highest reputation. To assess if  higher
reputation is associated with distant strategic competitive positions, the following
hypothesis also is offered:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the firm's distance from its group strategic competitive 
profile mean, the better its reputation.
The second hypothesis is based on the reputation-performance perspective. 
However, there may be confounding factors not readily identified in this test. That is, 
there are likely more components to reputation than simply those measured by
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performance. Therefore, the focus o f the third test is to determine i f  such other 
components exist above and beyond any measured performance. Since the exact nature 
o f such components is currently not known, the third test w ill be somewhat exploratory 
in nature. Rdatedly, the relationship between firm strategic group location and any 
identifiable components can not be predicted at this time. Any identified relationship might 
therefore be explored through post hoc analysis. In sum, determination o f any 
nonperformance-based relationship between firm reputation and strategic group location 
w ill be tested as:
Hypothesis 3: After controlling for performance, firms farthest from the group
strategic competitive profile mean w ill have higher reputations.
Reputation and Strategic Competitive Position Changes
Firms that experience a change in reputation are likely to also experience a change 
in market opportunities, and hence a change in the strategic competitive position (i.e., 
strategic group location) ofthe firm (Ferguson, Barrese and Levy, 1998). This strategic 
competitive position change may be designed to either restore previously good reputation 
if  a fall in ratings has occurred or take advantage o f a new status if  ratings have increased. 
For example, firms that have suffered a decrease in reputation may feel a need to improve 
their reputation to avoid potential negative consequences (e.g., exclusion from some 
markets, avoidance by risk and investment professionals, lowering o f stock or bond prices, 
regulatory scrutiny).
On the other hand, insurer strategic decision makers o f firms that enjoy an increase 
in reputation must decide if  they now have an opportunity to tap potentially better markets 
where they may have previously had limited presence or even been excluded. Entering or
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expanding operations in such markets (i.e., change in scope o f operations) likely involves 
reallocation o f resources, and may be very profitable in that the higher the insurer rating, 
the better the quality o f risk it can attract. This ability to write higher quality business can 
result in opportunities to improve loss ratios and investment returns, both critical 
dimensions o f financial performance. While these strategic responses to changes in 
reputation ratings seem appropriate, neither the strategic change nor reputation literature 
addresses this relationship. The current research thus seeks to determine if  reputation 
change is related to strategic competitive change by testing:
Hypothesis 4: Change in reputation w ill lead to a change in strategic competitive
position.
To test these hypotheses, the relationship between strategic competitive position 
and reputation w ill first be assessed. Then, reputation change and its influence on strategic 
competitive position change w ill be examined.
METHODS
Sample
The current sample originally employed the top 100 property/casualty firms by 
1996 premiums written, for which complete data were available, representing 64% o f total 
market share. Careful analysis revealed that five firms had either substantially changed 
their structure during the course o f the study or competed in very narrow market segments 
(e.g., mortgage insurance) and were considered extreme outliers not representative ofthe 
population. Since study o f such firms often requires qualitative analysis which is beyond 
the scope o f this paper, these outliers were dismissed from further analysis. Thus, the final 
sample consisted o f ninety five larger property/casualty firms.
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One important implication o f sample size is its effect on statistical power. An alpha 
= .10 was deemed acceptable for this exploratory work, resulting in adequate statistical 
power to detect all large and medium effects, although we could not be sure o f detecting 
all small effects (Cohen, .1988). Thus, a trade-off was precipitated by the decision to 
include firms most clearly in competition with each other (i.e., large firms) at the expense 
o f statistical power relative to small effects.
Measures
Insurer ratings. Individual rating agencies long have been recognized as providing 
valuable information to actual and potential policyholders regarding the default or claims- 
paying risk o f one insurer relative to another. Four well respected ratings agencies (A. M. 
Best, S&P, Weiss Ratings and Moody's Investor Services) were considered for use in this 
research. However, Moody's only values a small percentage o f insurers each year (less 
than half o f our sample) and was therefore excluded from this analysis. An average o f the 
Best, S&P and Weiss ratings therefore w ill be used to measure reputation in this study.
Each agency offers their own opinion as to the financial stability and risk o f an 
insurer, and each employs a proprietary rating philosophy and method to realize its 
individual competitive advantage (Klein, 1992). That is, each agency has a unique way o f 
determining their rating that is not disseminated. However, portions ofthe process may 
be revealed to insurers in an application-based perspective. Insurers may receive feedback 
from raters on how ratings might be influenced by particular proposed strategic changes 
(Fillingham, 1993). Although the process may be somewhat cloaked, the resultant ratings 
are widely publicized, readily available independent measures o f insurer reputation.
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The Weiss ratings are normally distributed and use an academic based grading scale 
o f alphabetic rank, including A, B, C, D, and E with a plus or minus available for each, 
along with a simple F (no plus or minus). Therefore, sixteen rating levels are available to 
rate firms, and can be assigned numeric values such as A+=16, A -15...  F=1 to measure 
change in firm  reputation easily, as well as compare measures across firms and groups. 
Ratings ofD+ or below indicate potential vulnerability or substantial weaknesses that may 
cause the firm  to have significant financial difficulties, especially in an unfavorable 
economic environment.
Ratings ofthe A. M. Best Company follow an A-F pattern. Best assigns ratings 
o f A++, A+, A, A-, B++, B+, B, B-, C++, C+, C, C-, D, E, and F, which are essentially 
normally distributed around an A rating. Ratings o f B+ and above are considered secure, 
while ratings o f B and below are considered vulnerable. Ratings o f D, E, and F are 
reserved for firms below minimum standards, under state supervision, and in liquidation, 
respectively, and are thus not often levied (i.e., applied to aggregate total o f less than 4% 
o f all 24SS firms rated in 1993). Thus, fifteen ratings levels are available to rate firms and 
can be assigned numeric values as described above, such as A++=15, A+=14,. . .  F=l.
S&P ratings follow an A-C pattern: AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, 
BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC and R. Firms with ratings o f AAA to BBB- 
are considered in the secure range, while firms with ratings ofBB+ to CCC are considered 
vulnerable. An “R”  rating is reserved for those firms undergoing regulatory action. Thus, 
eighteen rating levels are available to rate firms and can be assigned numeric values, such 
as AAA=18, AA+«17,. . .  R=l.
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Ratings assigned by each o f the three agencies (i.e., Best, S&P and Weiss) were 
used to create a composite measure by standardizing the variables and averaging the 
standardized scores for each firm in each year o f the analysis (see Table 3.1 for 
correlations). The resulting composite appears in the current research as the variable 
"reputation.”  Overall, the reliability coefficient for this three-item set o f observations 
indicates an alpha o f 0.686. A related variable used in this research is "change in 










A ll correlations are significant at p < .001 
Additional reliability analysis revealed that deletion o f either the Best or Weiss 
ratings would have decreased the alpha to unacceptable levels (.3821 and .5130, 
respectively). I f  the S&Ps ratings were deleted from the composite score, the alpha would 
have increased to .8114. However, the S&P component ofthe composite appears to 
contribute at least a partially unique reputation assessment, as witnessed by the correlation 
analysis. Although inclusion o f S&P does lower the alpha, it remains in a generally 
acceptable range for exploratory work such as the current research (Hair et a/., 1995).
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Thus, a slightly lower alpha was deemed acceptable in order to capture the conceptual 
differences in reputation gauged by the S&P rating, and it remained in the analysis.
Control measures. Five performance variables previously developed (see 
discussion beginning on page 40, Study I o f this series) were employed in this analysis, 
primarily as control factors in assessing nonperformance components ofthe relationship 
between reputation and strategic group location. Performance measures used are expense 
ratio, change in premiums, change in surplus, loss ratio and yield.
Other measures. Strategic groups were formed through cluster analysis on eleven 
variables ofinterest representing scope ofoperations and resource deployment dimensions, 
both critical components o f firm strategic competitive position (see discussion o f rationale 
and calculation formulas that begins on page 30 in Study I). Three groups emerged in 
each o f the years o f study (1993-1996). Resulting scores for each firm indicated its 
strategic competitive position relative to the cluster center. This measure o f strategic 
competitive position is used extensively in this paper. Strategic group zones {i.e., core, 
periphery and fringe) were identified by variance associated with mean distance from the 
strategic group cluster center. Study II  provides extensive details on the zone assignment 
processes.
Three variables are new to the third study. The variable “distance”  represents the 
absolute value o f the distance from the respective strategic group core for each firm for 
each year o f observation. "Distance”  w ill be used in regressions associated with 
hypotheses two and three, which address the strategic competitive position-reputation 
relationship. The final test involves determining i f uchange in firm reputation”  is related
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to “change in strategic competitive position” , the other two new variables. Change scores 
were calculated for each o f these two variables over the 1993-96 period. Two reasons 
exist for examining a cumulative change measure rather than a year-by-year evaluation. 
First, the sample o f interest consists o f large, reasonably stable firms with generally small 
changes in reputation expected from year to year. Strategic changes are also likely to be 
incremental and take the form o f small steps or changes over time (Porter, 1980). Second, 
not all firms are rated simultaneously by all ratings companies. That is, the timetable for 
assignment o f new ratings is dependent on the rater, the insurer and/or economic factors. 
Thus, a single measure o f change for each variable across the study period appears most 
appropriate.
Statistical Analyses
Reputation and strategic competitive position. The relationship between 
reputation and strategic competitive position is the first issue o f interest, with three tests 
offered to examine the relationship. The test ofhypothesis one w ill look at the relationship 
between strategic group zone membership and reputation. To test the assertion that 
reputation is related to within-group strategic competitive position, firms w ill first be 
grouped based on zone membership (i.e., core, periphery, fringe) regardless o f strategic 
group membership. That is, all core firms from groups 1,2, and 3 together, etc., with data 
pooled for the periods o f interest, 1993-1996. Multivariate analysis o f variance 
(MANOVA) with between-subjects factors o f core, periphery and fringe membership 
status w ill then be employed to test for reputation differences based on intra-group 
strategic competitive position. Bonferroni post hoc pairwise comparisons w ill be used to
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determine significant relationships between strategic group core, periphery and fringe
zones. The initial test is:
H o :|ie = |l,=  m 
against Not Ho: | ie = |i, = f t
where c = core zone,
p=periphery zone, and 
f  = fringe zone.
The second part o f the reputation/intra-group strategic competitive position 
relationship analysis w ill measure whether there is a reputation premium associated with 
being far from the core as presented in hypotheses two and three. A simple regression 
employing pooled data for the years o f interest (1993-1996) w ill use absolute value o f 
distance from the respective strategic group core means as the independent variable and 
reputation as the dependent variable to test hypothesis two. In order to test for 
nonperformance-based components o f the relationship as explored in hypothesis three, 
regression was repeated with five performance variables important to property/casualty 
insurers used as control variables (i.e., expense ratio, investment yield, loss ratio, change 
in premiums and change in surplus).
Reputation and strategic competitive position change. Hypothesis four 
proposes that firms experiencing a change in reputation may feel obligated to change 
strategic competitive position, other in an attempt to reclaim their previously higher 
reputation, or to adjust their strategy to meet the needs o f a different customer base. 
Thus, the strategic competitive position change-reputation change relationship is possibly 
U-shaped, and a regression model that includes a curvilinear component w ill be tested. 
A  positive quadratic term is anticipated due to the expected upward U-shaped curve. The
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absolute value o f distance o f firm movement from its original strategic competitive
position in 1993 (time t) to its 1996 position (time t+3) w ill be regressed onto the change
in firm reputation (as measured by reputation score at time t+3 minus score at time t). The
primary goal here w ill be to determine change relationships, or lack thereof as the
influence o f reputation ratings on strategic competitive positioning is assessed with the
following equation:
Y = b0+ b,X ,+ b jX ,2
where Y = absolute value o f change in strategic competitive position relative to the 
strategic group mean, 
b, = intercept,
X| -  change in reputation, and 
X,3 = curvilinear effect o fX ,.
RESULTS
Means, standard deviations and correlations among the variables o f interest are 
presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The highest correlation was between reputation and 
change in reputation (0.443)* which were expected to be somewhat correlated. Even so, 
each is still representative o f substantial unique data and. remained part o f further analysis, 
as did all other variables.
Statistical Analyses
Reputation and strategic competitive position. Results o f tests associated with 
hypothesis one reveal that there is no significant relationship between intra-group strategic 
competitive position as measured by zone membership and zone reputation score (F-.75S, 
#=2,372, p<471) (see Table 3.4). Additional post hoc examination showed no significant
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pairwise relationships. No evidence is found to support hypothesis one and it is therefore 
rejected. Strategic group zones do not appear to have different reputations.
Table 3.2
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 t
Variables
1. Reputation .019 .977
2. Distance .677 .689 .070
3. Expense Ratio -.010 .938 -.273 -.279
4. Change in Premiums .000 1.00 .104 -.104 .102
3. Change in Surplus .006 .998 .089 -.013 -.051 .303
6. Loss Ratio .000 .997 -.224 .182 -.226 .032 -.008
7. Yield .001 .986 -.063 -.062 .087 -.015 -.143 -.006
n=380 A ll correlations > .143 are significant at p < .01, all >.102 are significant at p < .03.
Table 3.3




8. Change in Strategic .580 .493
Competitive Position
9. Change in Reputation______ -.263 .132 .387*
n=95,* correlation significant at p<.01
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Table 3.4
Strategic Competitive Position and Reputation
hf380
___________________SarosfSqnarca 4f Mean Square F Slg
Between Groups 3.062 2 2.531 .733 .471
Within Groups 1247.683 372 3.334__________________
Hypothesis two suggests firms found farther from the mean strategic group 
competitive profile should have higher reputations. No support was found for the 
contention as the distance measure was not statistically significant (see Table 3.S). Thus, 
hypothesis two also is rejected.
Table 3.5
Regression - Reputation and Distances from Strategic Group Core
Uastaadardizcd Coefficients Sid. Coef.
B Std. Error Beta t Sij.
Intercept -.03273 .058 -  -.365 .572
Distance .0809 .063 .070 1.288 .199
R* *  .005 n-380
Adj. Ra -  .002____F>1.66,p<.199________________________________________
Hypothesis three proposed that there may be a nonperformance based component 
to the relationship proposed in hypothesis two (i.e., strategic competitive position- 
reputation), and therefore retested the previously described regression model while 
controlling for performance. The model is statistically significant (see Table 3.6), however 
the distance measure is not Therefore, hypothesis three also is rejected.
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Table 3.6




_______________B______Std. Error Beta_______t______ Sig.
Intercept -.007161 .055 - -.131 .896
Distance .04098 .061 .036 .674 .501
Expense Ratio -.275 .045 -.324 •6.035 .000
Change in Premium .124 .056 .126 2.223 .027
Change in Surplus .02035 .043 .027 .468 .640
Loss Ratio -.244 .043 -.290 -5.673 .000
Yield .003188 .041 .004 .078 .938
R*-.171 
Adj. R *«. 156
n-380 
F>11.372, p<.000
Reputation and strategic competitive position change. The final test was 
designed to look at whether reputation change is related to strategic competitive 
positioning change. Hypothesis four and the proposed curvilinear relationship are 
supported in that the model is statistically significant. Practical significance is present since 
adjusted R2 (.207) indicates approximately 21% o f the variance in strategic competitive 
change can be accounted for by change in reputation (see Table 3.7). The standardized 
model representing the relationship is Y  = -.27X, + .29X2. Both greater positive and 
negative changes in reputation caused greater changes in strategic competitive position. 
That is, as reputation increases or decreases, firms are inclined to move away from the 
strategic group mean competitive profile. Figure 3.1 details the relationship, where 
X=change in reputation and Y=change in strategic competitive position.
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Table 3.7
Regression * Overall Competitive Position Change onto Reputation Change
Unstandardbed Coefficients Std. Coef.
I ______ Std. Irrs r leU _________ t_______Sig.
Intercept .395 .068 - 5.834 .000
Reputation
Change
-.105 .040 -.270 •2.635 .010
Reputation
Change2
.052 .018 .290 2.827 .006
R2 *  .224 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose o f this research has been to contribute to the reputation, strategic 
competitive positioning and associated change literature on three fronts. First, 
establishment o f whether there is a relationship between firm reputation and its strategic 
competitive position was a priority. Second, determination o f any reputation penalty 
associated with certain strategic competitive positions was in order. Finally, examining 
any relationship between firms experiencing a change in reputation and associated changes 
in their strategic competitive position was explored. The findings o f this research have 
several theoretical and practical implications, which are discussed below.
No significant relationship was found between intra-group strategic competitive 
position, as measured by strategic group zone membership, and overall firm reputation. 
This finding contradicts the reputation-performance perspective, which suggests a 
complementary relationship between reputation and performance is to be expected {e.g., 
Sobol and Farrelly, 1988). Since results from Study I  o f this series indicate that the fringe 
zones had higher performance than their core or periphery counterparts, reputation was 
expected also to have been highest for the fringe zone. It was not. These findings o f little 
intra-group difference in reputation indicate that strategic group zones and relationships 
across those zones were not especially fruitful levels o f analyses for exploration o f the 
strategic competitive position-reputation relationship, at least for this sample of 
property/casualty firms. Although performance differences have been associated with 
strategic competitive position relative to strategic group location (see Study I), the current 
study indicates the same may not be so for reputation differences.
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The second test was somewhat similar to the first, but this time particular firm 
strategic competitive position was proposed to influence reputation in that firms 
strategically positioned farthest from the strategic group center were expected to have 
higher reputations. This was not supported by data in the current study. Non-significance 
in proposed relationships between reputation and strategic competitive position within the 
strategic group indicate one (or more) factors may be important: 1) the reputation- 
performance theories are not supported, 2) the level o f analysis employed on some tests 
(e.g., strategic groups and their zones) may be incorrect, or 3) the data at hand was 
insufficient to uncover reputation-strategic competitive position relationships that might 
exist.
Although each may have contributed to the lack o f findings, the level o f analysis 
may be the explanation with the most merit, especially if  measurement issues are 
considered. Specifically, strategic groups, their zones and distance measures across these 
groups and zones were used in the analysis. Difficulties may lie in that the process used 
to produce strategic groups in effect collapsed information contained in the eleven 
variables o f interest into a single score. For each firm, this score represented distance from 
the average competitive profile for the strategic group in which it was a member. This 
allowed for parsimonious comparison o f firms within and across groups, but the tradeoff 
was that some information was lost in the process. Groups were further trichotomized by 
the procedure to assign zones, an additional potential masking o f nuances in the data. I f  
strategic competitive position had been assessed on a firm basis (as opposed to the 
grouping or zone level), then perhaps a reputation-strategic competitive position
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relationship would have emerged. Future research should assess ways to determine this 
potential relationship. In general, studies o f the reputation-strategic competitive position 
relationship on the intra-group level were counter to expectations.
The final test studied the relationship between changes in firm  reputation and 
strategic competitive positioning. Reputation theory suggests that a change in firm 
reputation, either positive or negative, is likely to be a catalyst for strategic change. This 
contention was supported, as a significant equation with a positive quadratic term was 
found (indicating the predicted U-shape). Firms with a ratings increase may experience 
higher demand, relatively better risks and higher premium receipts - all which serve to 
reduce liquidity risks and provide the opportunity to better diversify and strengthen the 
firm's investment portfolio (Ferguson, Barrese and Levy, 1998). These firms may change 
their scope o f operations in order to pursue a better risk, higher volume client base that 
may have been previously unaccessible. At the same time, a broader category o f 
investments options may now be available that allows adjustments in resource deployment 
strategies.
Conversely, firms that experience a decrease in reputation ratings can expect the 
opposite effect. That is, lower demand, a more inferior applicant pool and lower premium 
receipts • all which increase the risk o f adverse underwriting experiences and non­
competitive pricing (Ferguson, Barrese and Levy, 1998). Lower premium receipts may 
raise liquidity risks and further draw insurers toward a more risky investment portfolio in 
an attempt to regain lost financial stability associated with the previously higher rating and 
corresponding market approach. Again, a change in reputation encourages reforms in both
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scope o f operations and resource deployment strategies, both components o f firm strategic 
competitive position.
It appears that either positive or negative changes in firm reputation may catalyze 
strategic competitive position dynamics. Perhaps firms that experience reputation changes 
fed compelled or inspired to seek a new competitive equilibrium that complements their 
new competitive environment. Greater weight can now be given to the argument that firm 
reputation is indeed o f critical importance in the strategic planning process, including 
resource deployment and scope o f operations decisions. Thus, ratings agencies, such as 
the ones employed in this analysis o f the property/casualty sector o f the insurance industry, 
can be viewed as quite influential and wielding substantial power in the assessment o f firms 
they rate.
Understanding the influence o f reputation change on strategic competitive position 
change could provide practitioners and researchers alike with a benchmark o f sorts. For 
instance, dynamics in reputation appear to encourage movement away from the mean 
strategic group competitive profile. This may be indicative o f firm willingness to take 
more risk by assuming a more unique strategic competitive position. This is consistent 
with more risky behavior associated with a firm's search for a solution to adverse 
performance (March, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 1982), or a search for a niche 
that may produce persistent positive abnormal returns (Jacobsen, 1988). Future research 
may be able to determine which competitive aspects are most likely subject to change in 
such strategic realignment processes.
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The size and nature o f the sample may have presented limitations with potential 
impact on all tests. Given the study sample size, only medium and large effects could be 
detected at the alpha level o f .05 (see Study I  for a discussion). Thus, all small effects may 
not have been revealed and potentially important relationships may have gone unnoticed. 
The study sample contained only large property/casualty insurance firms, thus the same 
results may not hold true in a random sample o f the sector, for smaller firms or in the 
life/health sector o f the industry. For instance, reputation may be a more salient concern 
to insurers writing life policies because o f longer product duration. Additionally, life 
policy purchases are entirely voluntary, whereas property/casualty policy purchases may 
be mandatory to meet governmental or lender requirements imposed on potential 
policyholders. Therefore, different results may be found in the other major sector o f the 
insurance industry. Future research should seek to replicate the current findings on the 
firm level, using a larger sample perhaps with smaller sized firms, and with data from the 
life/health sector o f the insurance industry or from other industries.
Researchers and managers alike now have preliminary evidence that some 
performance-based relationships that might be theoretically appealing (i.e., strategic 
competitive position as measured by strategic group zone location is related to reputation) 
may not be empirically supported. However, the theoretically proposed relationship that 
a change in firm reputation leads to a change in strategic competitive position is 
empirically supported. In sum, these findings give preliminary indication that performance- 
based reputation may not be reflected in particular strategic group positions o f a firm, but 
that change in reputation appears to be catalytic to strategic competitive position change.
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CONCLUSION
The three studies comprising this investigation were designed to take a more 
intimate look at strategic group structure and competitive profile changes within and 
across strategic groups over time. The potential influence o f change in reputation on 
group strategic competitive profile was also evaluated. Results o f Study I  indicated two 
broad conclusions. First, significant differences in strategic competitive profile, as 
characterized by scope o f operations and resource deployment measures, across strategic 
group zones {i.e., core, periphery and fringe) were identified. Some o f these zones 
possessed homogeneous segments, indicating the existence o f intra-strategic group 
structure. Second, significant performance differences across these zones are noted in two 
o f three identified strategic groups.
Results o f Study n  revealed two o f the three identified strategic groups changed 
their competitive profile over the period o f analysis. The competitive profile o f these 
groups became more alike over the years, and strategic competitive variety within each 
group decreased. The remaining group had a stable competitive profile over the course 
o f the study. Most ofthe firms that changed strategic groups moved toward one particular 
group, supporting the existence o f an isomorphic occurrence. Firms that changed 
competitive profile, as measured by membership change in strategic group zones, most 
often imitated the strategic group that concentrated in selling products to small businesses. 
Perhaps this pattern emerged because o f fundamental environmental changes, including 
market and regulatory changes that greatly affected the traditional distribution network, 
as well as a substantial increase in the financial impact o f natural disasters.
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Finally, the level o f change activity influenced performance, with firms who 
changed their competitive profile on a yearly basis suffering higher loss ratios, one ofthe 
key measures o f insurer performance, than those who changed competitively less often. 
The direction o f change activity (i.e., decoupling or tighter coupling) did not seem to 
matter, as long as a firm changed competitively less often. This supports the notion that 
strategic change cannot be a short-term concept. The identified strategic group and zonal 
change patterns, degree o f coupling across time, and type, level and distance o f strategic 
change all provide insight into the performance ramifications o f particular types o f 
strategic competitive change, as well as the possible emergence o f trends within the 
industry under study. This suggests that researchers should not overlook the potentially 
valuable information that may be revealed from studying intra-group strategic change.
Results o f Study m  showed no significant relationship between firm reputation and 
intra-strategic group competitive position, either on the zone or firm level. However, 
changes in firm reputation influenced strategic competitive position change. This indicates 
that those in position to disseminate opinions on reputation, in this case various ratings 
agencies, should be considered powerful sources o f influence on the strategic planning 
process.
In sum, these studies contribute to the strategic groups literature by establishing 
intra-group structure and strategic relationships across identified core, periphery and fringe 
zones. The strategic change literature is enhanced by providing evidence o f how type, 
level and direction o f firm strategic change relative to group competitive profile influences 
performance, one o f the cornerstones o f strategic research. Finally, the reputation and
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strategic change literature has been enhanced in that some theoretically expected 
relationships could not be empirically verified, suggesting that further research is 
warranted to ascertain the correctness o f these theories. Rating intermediaries were shown 
to have greatly influenced the strategic planning process.
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